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Lisa Collins, Clerk of Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State 
P. O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230 
RE: MARLENE STONE, Plaintiff/Appellee, vs. RICHARD FLINT and JUDY FLINT, 
Defendants/Appellants, Case No. 080907234, Trial Court No.: 20090564- C ^ 
Dear Ms. Collins, 
Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Appellant provides that "after 
oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate 
court, by letter" when pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of the 
party. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(j) (2010). This matter was heard on 
May 27, 2010 and no decision has been issued. 
During oral argument the Honorable Judge Gregory K. Orme inquired whether 
Appellants'third argument (concerning whether the trial court misstated or omitted 
salient facts in its judgment) was waived for failure to object to the trial court's findings 
of fact prior to appeal. The parties did not address the issue in their briefs. After the 
hearing Appellant reviewed Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
applicable case law on the question and provides this supplemental authority to the 
question raised. 
Rule 52 provides that "the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has 
made in the district court an objection to such findings . . ." Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure Utah, Rule 52 (2010). In 2009 the Utah Supreme Court addressed the 
difference between a challenge to the adequacy of the court's findings (i.e. the level of 
detail) versus a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence when it stated: 
A challenge to the adequacy of the court's findings is notably 
different from a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence. "It is 
one thing for a party to say that the judge's findings are 
erroneous because they are contrary to or unsupported by the 
evidence, and quite another to say that the findings are 
l 
that a party/ challenge the evidentiary support for a court's 
findings shortly after the court articulates them. But it is quite 
a different matter and wholly necessary for a party to 
challenge and thus afford the trial court "an opportunity to 
correct the alleged error" of inadequately detailed findings in 
order to provide for meaningful appellate review of the court's 
decision. . . 
State ex rel. K.F., 201 P.3d 985, lj 61 (Utah 2009)(quoting from 438 Main Street v. Easy 
Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ^  54, 99 P.3d 801). 
In the current case Appellants' third issue concerns whether the trial court's 
Findings of Fact supported its conclusion and omitted or misstated salient facts which 
were critical 10 its ruling. The Appellants" challenge was not to the adequacy or detail of 
the trial court's findings, but the sufficiency of the evidence. The Court found that only 
three lounging/loafing sheds, and some mobile gates and panels were on Stone's property 
and in dispute in the suit. However, the testimony at trial showed a different picture. In 
addition to the three sheds, mobile gates and mobile panels in dispute, at the time of the 
closing on the real estate two feeders, a number of waterers, and the horse walker were 
physically located on Stone's property. The Flints subsequently took possession of the 
two acres, as well as the all the feeders, waterers and horse walker, all located on Stone's 
property. Stone raised no objection to this, but objected only to the Flints taking the 
gates, panels, and three lounging/loafing sheds on Stone's property. The trial court made 
detailed findings and chose to omit the presence of feeders and waters on Stone's 
property at the time of closing, that the Flints took possession of this personalty, and that 
Stone did not to dispute Flint's ownership of the same. In addition, the trial court also 
misstated the timing of when the horse walker was first discussed between the parties, 
which was months after Flints purchased the property, and instead found that the parties 
had discussed the horse walker at the time of closing-which timing is critical in 
determining whether the REPC and Bill of Sale are ambiguous. 
Appellants urge the panel to consider the above named authority when detemiining 
whether Appellants third issue concerns the sufficiency of the evidence, and find that the 
Appellants have not challenged the adequacy or level of detail of the trial court's 
findings. ^—\ 
/Respect&Hy^ 
David B. SteveHson, No. 12244 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARLENE STONE, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RICHARD FLINT and JUDY FLINT, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 080907234 
Trial Court No.: 20090564 
Jurisdictional Statement 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)G) (2008). 
Statement Of The Issues 
1. Did the trial court err in determining that the Real Estate Purchase Contract 
between Appellants and Appellee was facially unambiguous and thereby excluding 
parol evidence from the case notwithstanding the fact that the Contract and Bill of 
Sale expressly included personal property outside the surveyed boundary of the 
real property? 
Determinative law for issue No.l: Flores v. Earnshaw, 2009 UT App 90; Cafe Rio 
v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, 2009 UT 27, 207 P.3d 1235; Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 
UT51, 190 P.3d 1269. 
Standard of Review for Issue No. 1: A reviewing court "review[s] a district court's 
interpretation of a written contract for correctness, granting no deference to the 
court below." Cafe Rio *{ 21. 
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Issue preserved in the record: The issue was preserved in the record at Transcript 
Volume 1, pp. 195-197; 205-229. 
Did the trial court err in excluding witnesses under Utah R. of Evid. 401 when 
their testimony was that Appellee attempted to sell them the same personal 
property and real property that Appellee sold to the Appellants? 
Determinative law for issue No.2: Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 190 P.3d 1269. 
Standard of Review for Issue No. 2: A trial court's decision to admit or exclude 
evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Daines ^ 21. A trail court's ruling 
on evidence will be reversed it if was beyond the limits of reasonability. Id. 
Issue preserved in the record: The issue was preserved in the record in Transcript 
Volume I, pp. 131-141. 
Did the trial court err in its finding that certain farm equipment was not located on 
Appellee's property at the time of the sale? 
Determinative law for issue No.3: Western Capital and Securities, Inc. v. 
Knudsvig, 768 P.2d 989 (Utah App. 1989); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 
(Utah App. 1989); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). 
Standard of Review for Issue No. 3: A trial court's findings of fact will be reversed 
if clearly erroneous. Gilmour v. Cummings, 904 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1995). 
Issue preserved in the record: The issue was preserved in the record at R. Trans. 
Vol. 1, pp. 38-39, 60-63, 66-71, 88, 90, 145-149. 
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Statement Of The Case 
Nature of the Case: 
The case heard by the trial court is a breach of contract and/or conversion claim 
between the vendor and vendee of real property and farm-related personalty located in 
Hooper, Utah. At issue is whether the Appellants/Defendants/Counterclaimants 
(hereinafter "Flints") purchased all personal property of the 
Appellee/Plaintiff/Counterdefendant (hereinafter "Stone") that constituted farm 
equipment on her entire seventeen acre parcel, or merely the personal properly located on 
the two-acre parcel. Ultimately, the trial court found that it had to construe the language 
of the parties' Real Estate Purchase Contract, with its associated Addenda, and a Bill of 
Sale. 
Course of Proceedings: 
This case was filed on 13 November 2008 in the Second Judicial District for 
Weber County. Plaintiff Stone initially filed an eviction action against the Defendant 
Flints alleging that Defendants committed waste on fifteen acres that Defendant Flints 
leased from Plaintiff Stone. Defendants filed an answer and counterclaim on 20 
November 2008 alleging causes of action for trespass, breach of contract, and conversion, 
and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. On 2 February 2009 the parties reached a 
Settlement Agreement in which Stone agreed to drop her claims against the Flints, and 
the Flints agreed to drop all claims except for their claim for breach of contract and 
conversion against Stone. In addition, the parties agreed to the terms and conditions of a 
Joint Motion for Stipulated Temporary Injunction (R. at Exh. 7, J^8 of Confidential 
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General Release and Settlement Agreement; Add. C). On 3 March 2009 the parties filed a 
joint Motion for Stipulated Temporary Injunction enjoining Plaintiff Stone from 
trespassing on Flints' property, enjoining Stone from direct contact with the Flints or 
from parking or driving on their property, and enjoining Stone from any stalking 
behavior. On 15 April 2009 at trial the parties stipulated to dismiss all actions except the 
issues of the ownership of numerous fence panels and gates, and three lounging/loafing 
sheds on Stone's real property. 
Disposition by Trial Court: 
All of the claims were resolved in the above-entitled action as a result of the final 
judgment of the trial court dismissing the Flints' Counterclaim on 1 June 2009. This 
appeal is taken from the court's Memorandum of Decision dated 24 April 2009, and it's 
Orders Dismissing the Flints' Couterclaim and making Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, both dated 1 June 2009. (R. at 0069-79; 0087-88; 0089-96.) 
Statement of Facts 
1. Stone owned real property known as 6006 S. 7100 W. in Hooper, Utah, 
consisting of approximately seventeen acres. (R. at 0089.) 
2. Stone listed the property for sale on the multiple listing services, giving 
prospective buyers three options: 1) purchase all seventeen acres, 2) purchase 
two acres, or 3) purchase one acre. (R. at 0089-90.) 
3. The Flints were interested in the property. They and their realtor Joe Adair met 
with Plaintiff on 1 February 2008. (R. at 0090.) 
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4. During this initial meeting, Stone explained that her husband had recently 
passed away, that she wanted to be relieved of the burden of managing the 
property by herself, and that she was interested in selling, preferably, all of her 
seventeen acres, including the structures on the property, but was willing to sell 
it in smaller parcels. Because the Flints could not afford all seventeen acres, the 
Flints indicated their interest in two acres. Mr. Flint inquired, "Does all of this 
stuff stay with the property?" Stone replied affirmatively. When Flint asked 
his question, he was looking out of Stone's bedroom window, facing to the east 
of Stone's property, overlooking the hay bam, horse, bam, and various items of 
personal property. The structures included mobile fencing, called panels; 
mobile gates; movable open sheds for animals, called loafing sheds; waterers 
and feeders for livestock, and a horse walker. (R. at 0090; Vol. 1, pp. 145-149; 
185-186.) 
5. The Flints expressed to Stone that they wished to purchase two acres, including 
the home and the two bams. (R. at 0090.) 
6. Stone explained that if the Flints bought only the two acres, she would retain a 
sixty-six-foot-wide strip lying on the northern part of the property and 
extending eastward, because she needed access to her remaining fifteen (15) 
acres in the back. Without this access, Stone would have been unable to access 
her property. (R. at 0090.) 
7. Stone also explained that a survey of the two acres would be necessary in order 
to create separate legal descriptions for the two acres and the remaining fifteen 
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acres. At that time, the boundaries of the proposed two acres were 
undetermined. (R. at 0090-91.) 
8. After the parties discussed the Flints' interest in only two acres and Stone said 
that the two-acre lot being sold them included "all the loafing sheds, all the 
gates, all the panels, all the waters, all the feeders, the horse barn and the hay 
shed", no further discussion took place regarding any structures, including the 
horse walker until after the sale. (R. at 0091; Vol. 1, pp. 145-149; 185-186.) 
9. Based on earlier discussions, the Flints believed that they were buying all the 
personal property on the entire seventeen acres as part of the purchase. (R. at 
0091.) 
10. On 1 February 2008, the Flints' real estate agent, Joe Adair, prepared and 
presented a real estate purchase contract ("REPC") to Stone. The first 
addendum to the REPC provided that Stone would have the property surveyed 
and the four corners staked to the satisfaction of the Flints. The addendum also 
listed the structures included in the sale as "all lounging/loafing sheds, panels, 
gates, feeders/waterers and horse walker as presently exist." (R. at 0031; 0091; 
Exhibit or Exh. 1; Addendum or Add. A.) 
11. As agreed, Stone had the property surveyed and the four corners staked just 
prior to closing, which occurred on 16 April 2008. (R. at 0092.) 
12. At the time of closing, two feeders, waterers, the horse walker, four sixteen-
foot and eleven ten-foot panels, four mobile gates, and three lounging/loafing 
sheds were physically located on Stone's remaining fifteen acre parcel. Two 
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feeders, three lounging/loafing sheds and a much smaller number of panels and 
gates were physically located on the Flints' property, plus 12 square panels (R. 
at Vol. 1, pp. 38-39, 60-63, 66-71, 88, 90, 145-149.) 
13. The Flints subsequently took possession of the two acres, as well as feeders, 
waterers, and the horse walker, all located on Stone's property. (R. at Vol. 1, 
pp. 148-49, 66-68; Add. C.) 
14. The horse walker was a large structure with a cement slab and was located on 
Appellee Stone's property after the Flints' two-acre lot was surveyed. Stone 
and the Flints expressly agreed to such, stating that the horse walker "is located 
on the STONE'S real property but which is the property of Flint pursuant to a 
16 April 2008 Real Estate Purchase Contract and accompanying Bill of Sale of 
the same date." (R. Add. 3; Exh. 7, [^9 of Confidential General Release and 
Settlement Agreement; R. at 0032; Vol. 1, p. 125) 
15. Contemporaneous with the closing, Stone leased the remaining fifteen acres to 
the Flints. The lease has since been terminated by mutual agreement. (R. at 
0093.) 
16. Flints assumed the original address 6006 S. 7100 W. in Hooper, Utah upon the 
purchase (i.e at closing) of Stone's home and two acres. At an unknown date 
following the sale of Stone's home and lot, Stone received a new address for 
her remaining 15 acres, known as 5990 S. 7100 W., in Hooper, Utah. (R. at 
0092-93.) 
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Contemporaneously with the closing of the real property, the title company 
prepared a bill of sale that Plaintiff signed and Defendants accepted in the 
closing. The bill of sale transferred title to "that certain personal real property 
now at 6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, Utah." (R. at 0032; see Exh. 2 and Add. 2.) 
The bill of sale then enumerated the personal property specified in the first 
addendum to the REPC "as presently exist." Exh. 2; Add. 2; (R. at 0031-32.) 
The Flints proffered the testimony of Jeffrey Dean Harris and his wife Vickie 
Harris, who were potential buyers of the same two-acre parcel that Ms. Stone 
sold the Flints. (R. at Vol. 1, pp. 132-141.) The Harris couple found Stone's 
two-acre lot on the multiple listing service and viewed the property with their 
realtor. At trial, when Jeffrey Harris was asked by Flints' counsel what 
personal property (i.e. farm equipment) Ms. Stone stated was included with the 
purchase of the two-acre parcel, Stone's counsel objected on numerous 
grounds. Id. The trial Court excluded the testimony of Jeffrey Dean Harris and 
his wife Vickie Harris for lack of relevancy. The court stated, "I just don't 
think it's relevant." (R. at Vol. 1, p. 141.) The court stated, speaking of Ms. 
Stone, "If she said something that she's now denying in this trial, and Mr. Flint 
is contending that it occurred, and she told him, then it would be very relevant, 
because it would be an admission against interest. . . . the fact that she makes a 
different offer to a different person on a different day can't be controlling in 
this case." Id. 
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19. After the sale a dispute arose concerning the lease. At that time Ms. Stone for 
the first time told Mr. Flint that he had to remove the horse walker to his 
property and informed him that she disputed the Flints' ownership of three of 
the loafing sheds and the mobile panels and gates located on her property. She 
did not raise a dispute over feeders, waterers and the horse walker that were on 
her property. Further, this was the first discussion between the parties 
concerning the horse walker. (R. at Vol. 1, pp. 66-69, 186-187; see also Vol. 1, 
pp. 38-39, 60-63, 66-71, 88, 90, 145-149.) 
Summary of Argument 
The trial court conducted a full trial on Flints' (Defendants'/Appellants') 
counterclaims for breach of contract and conversion concerning whether the three loafing 
sheds and numerous mobile panels and gates were their property pursuant to the parties' 
agreement. The court reviewed the Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC) between the 
parties and determined that, according to the four corners rule, the document was 
unambiguous. The Flints appealed. Three issues arise from the trial court's decision 
below. The first issue concerns whether the Real Estate Purchase Contract is 
unambiguous; the second issue concerns whether the court wrongfully excluded 
witnesses; the third issue concerns misstatements of fact in the trial court's Findings of 
Fact. 
The trial court erred in finding that the REPC was unambiguous because the REPC 
is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. At issue is whether the term "all", 
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used in the REPC and Bill of Sale in conjunction with a list of farm-related personalty, 
referred to 'all' Stone's farm-related personal property on her adjoining acreage, the 
personalty located on the two-acre lot sold to the Flints, or some combination of the two. 
The court found the language unambiguous even though the REPC and Bill of Sale 
specifically called out items which were not on the two-acre lot sold to the Flints and 
were not separately discussed or negotiated for by the parties. Notably, the Bill of Sale 
language selling "that certain personal property now at 6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, UT" 
expressly included a horse walker that was not physically located at the new address. In 
addition, waters and feeders that were on Stone's property at the time of closing were 
possessed by the Flints. This extrinsic evidence also informs the court of the ambiguity 
existing in the REPC and Bill of Sale, and opening the door to use parol evidence to 
determine the parties' intent in the sale. 
The trial court also erred when it excluded the testimony of two witnesses for the 
Flints that were going to testify that they met with Ms. Stone and were interested in 
buying the same two-acre property as the Flints. Their testimony of what personal 
property (i.e., farm-related equipment) Ms. Stone stated was included in the sale was 
excluded because the court found it irrelevant. The trial court reasoned that the 
discussion was not the same transaction and therefore irrelevant. 
Finally, the court's Findings of Fact omitted certain salient facts critical to the 
court's decision. Specifically, the court omitted the fact that at the time the parties closed 
on the real estate purchase, two feeders, several waterers, a horse walker, four sixteen-
foot and eleven ten-foot panels, four mobile gates, and three lounging/loafmg sheds were 
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physically located on Stone's adjoining parcel. The Flints gave testimony that they took 
possession of the feeders, waterers and the horse walker following the sale. While the 
court acknowledged in the Findings of Fact that the three lounging/loafing sheds, horse 
walker and the mobile gates and panels were on Appellee Stone's property at the time of 
sale, the court failed to acknowledge that feeders and waterers were located on Stone's 
property as well, and that the Flints took possession of these items after the sale. Further, 
the court misstated the evidence concerning whether the parties negotiated over the horse 
walker and looked to (and misstated) parol evidence taken at trial to reach its decision, 
notwithstanding its alleged reliance on the four-corners rule. 
Argument 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE REAL ESTATE 
PURCHASE CONTRACT WAS UNAMBIGUOUS. 
The trial court erred in its finding that the Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") 
and its accompanying addenda were not facially ambiguous, because the language 
contained therein was subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. 
A contractual term or provision is ambiguous "if it is capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other 
facial deficiencies." Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ^ 25 (quoting WebBankv. Am. Gen. 
Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, T| 20) (internal quotations omitted). Although the 
language of the contract itself is to be the primary source in making a determination of 
ambiguity, other evidence—if available—should be considered to determine whether 
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ambiguity exits. Dairies at \ 26. After examining the four corners of the document and 
any relevant evidence, if the court finds that the provisions in question are capable of 
more than one reasonable interpretation, parol evidence should be admitted to determine 
the parties' intentions. Flores v. Earnshaw, 2009 UT App 90, If 9 (Utah 1995). 
In this case, the trial court held that an Agreement consisting of a Real Estate 
Purchase Contract and various addenda was facially unambiguous. However, the 
provisions at issue in the trial court are capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation, and thus are ambiguous. 
The trial court rested its determination that the contract was facially unambiguous 
on two grounds. First, that Clause 1.1 of the REPC unambiguously asserted that the 
property at issue was not included in the transaction, and second, that the bill of sale later 
signed by the parties did the same. 
1. The REPC is Facially Ambiguous With Respect to Clause 1.1 and 
Addendum No. One. 
The REPC's Clause 1.1 and Addendum No. One create a facially ambiguous 
contract provision when viewed together, because the provision is subject to more than 
one reasonable interpretation. The trial court's determination that the contract at issue 
was facially unambiguous rested in large part on its analysis of Clause 1.1 of the REPC, 
which it found was "identical" to a contractual provision interpreted in a case recently 
decided by this court, Flores v. Earnshaw. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^ 4. 
Flores dealt with the sale of a not-yet-built condominium by use of a standard 
form Real Estate Purchase Contract similar to the one used in this case. 2009 UT App 90, 
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IHf 1-4. At issue was whether the parties had bargained for a fully built condominium 
unit, or merely a "shell," i.e., a unit not containing all necessary fixtures and 
infrastructure to make the building inhabitable and complete. Id. at fflj 5-6. Plaintiffs 
argument was essentially that because the condominium unit did not yet exist, Clause 
1.1—which specified that certain items were included "if presently owned and attached to 
the property"—was an ambiguous provision. Id. However, both parties were in 
agreement that the word "presently" referred to the date of the REPC's execution, and 
furthermore that "none of the items listed in Clause 1.1 were 'owned and attached to the 
property' at the time the REPC was executed because the building was not yet 
constructed." Flores J^ 14. On this basis, the Flores court found no ambiguity. Id. 
The trial court's error here is the faulty analogy to Flores, The contractual 
language at issue in the two cases is not the same. Flores interpreted only the standard 
boilerplate of the REPC contract, and did not address the addition of additional terms by 
an addendum. In other words, the ambiguity of the boilerplate provision of Clause 1.1 is 
not the issue here; it is whether that provision even properly controls or modifies the 
language in Addendum One. Also, the transaction in Flores did not involve the transfer 
of personal property not located on the real properly, as in this case. Furthermore, all the 
property at issue in this case actually existed at the time of sale, thus Clause 1.1 has 
significantly different implications here. 
The standard boilerplate language of Clause 1.1 of the REPC reads as follows: 
1.1 Included Items. Unless excluded herein, this sale includes the following 
items if presently owned and attached to the Property: plumbing, heating, air 
conditioning fixtures and equipment; ceiling fans; water heater; built-in 
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appliances; light fixtures and bulbs; bathroom fixtures; curtains, draperies and 
rods; window and door screens; storm doors and windows; window blinds; 
awnings; installed television antenna; satellite dishes and system; permanently 
affixed carpets; automatic garage door opener and accompanying transmitter(s); 
fencing; and trees and shrubs. 
This was the portion of Clause 1.1 at issue in Flores, which was found to be 
unambiguous in terms of what is included in the sale. However, this language is not 
Clause 1.1 in its entirely. Clause 1.1 also contains the following sentence immediately 
after the language quoted above: "The following items shall also be included in this sale 
and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title:" (emphasis added). 
This "also" provision of Clause 1.1 is followed by blank lines, on which, in the instant 
case—other items included in the sale are listed in handwriting. Here, the oven/range, 
refrigerator, and "window coverings as presently exist" are the items listed on those blank 
lines. 
The items named in the boilerplate portion of Clause 1.1 all are linked by a 
common thread; they are all items physically attached and are thus considered "part o f 
that building, i.e., "fixtures." As such, these fixtures are included in the sale, if present. 
However, it is the prerogative of the parties involved as to whether other, nonpermanent 
items, such as large household appliances should be included in the transaction. These 
items, while perhaps difficult to move, are not part of the building in the way that fixtures 
are. 
Therefore, the "also included" portion of Clause 1.1 is significant in that it 
contemplates items not "presently owned and attached to the Property" in the way that 
fixtures necessarily must be. In other words, such items "also included" are not subject to 
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being presently owned and attached to the property, but are included in the transaction by 
virtue of a provision separate from the first part of Clause 1.1. Clearly then, personal 
property located away from the real property can be included, such as the seller's 
personal property located on adjoining real property, or in a storage facility offsite. 
This "also included" clause is especially significant with respect to Addendum 
One of the REPC, as it highlights the inconsistencies in the trial court's ruling. 
Addendum One is incorporated into the agreement by Clause 9 of the REPC, and contains 
the following language, in pertinent part: 
This is an addendum to [the REPC], including all prior addenda and 
counteroffers between Richard & Judy Flint as Buyer, and Marlene Stone as 
Seller, regarding the Property located at 6006 So. 7100 West Hooper. The 
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC: Included items: All 
lounging/loafing sheds -panels, gates, feeders/caterers & horse walker as 
presently exist (emphasis added). 
Exh. 2; Add. 2; (R. at 0031-32.)(emphasis added). 
The trial court determined that this portion of Addendum One is properly 
integrated into Clause 1.1 of the REPC, and thus subject to the requirement that all the 
items listed therein be "presently owned and attached to the Property." Id. However, this 
determination is wrong. Because the items listed in Addendum One are all readily 
moveable, not attached to the property, and thus not properly considered "fixtures," it 
would be a reasonable interpretation of the contractual terms to determine that these items 
are governed by the second portion of Clause 1.1, and thus part of the transaction 
notwithstanding the language of the first portion. This interpretation is a reasonable one 
15 
based on the plain language of Clause 1.1 of the REPC and Addendum One? and is 
therefore a valid basis for a finding of facial ambiguity. 
A third interpretation is also possible. The REPC explicitly specifies in Clause 9 
that the terms of all addenda are incorporated into the REPC. However, the integration 
clause does not specify any specific part of the REPC to which those addenda must be 
integrated. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the terms contained in Addendum 
One stand on their own as a separate provision of the agreement, and are not necessarily 
modified or controlled by the language in any part of Clause 1.1 at all. In such a scenario, 
there would also be no requirement that any of the property listed in Addendum One be 
"presently attached" to the property at the time of sale. 
Clearly, the language contained in the REPC and Addendum One is subject to 
more than one reasonable interpretation, even when viewed in light of Clause 1.1. The 
ambiguity there lies mainly in how much, if any, of Clause 1.1 is actually applicable to 
the analysis of Addendum One. No evidence other than the plain language of the 
documents is required to support this analysis. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred when it disallowed parol evidence to determine 
the intent of the parties regarding the items listed in Addendum One. 
2. The Bill of Sale is Facially Ambiguous. 
The trial court also substantially based its decision on a determination that the bill 
of sale executed by the parties at closing was facially unambiguous. The bill of sale, 
among other things, contains a recitation of certain personal property intended to be 
conveyed in the transaction, and reads, in pertinent part: 
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SELLER . . . have/has bargained, sold, assigned and transferred, and by these 
presents do/does bargain, sell, assign and transfer unto said BUYER that certain 
personal property now at 6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, UT, 84315 WEBER County, 
State of UT, particularly described as follows: Oven/Range, Refrigerator, 
Window Covering, 2 Water Irrigation Shares, All Lounging and Loafing Sheds, 
Panels, Gates, Feeders, Waterers, and Horse Walker as presently exist. 
The trial court relied on the language "now at 6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, UT" to 
support its finding that the bill of sale was unambiguous. However, although at the outset 
this language appears to clearly limit the personal property transfer to include items then 
located on the two acres that would, upon recordation with Weber County, become the 
Flint's new address, this was not its function at all. Significantly, the included horse 
walker was located entirely on Stone's property. Thus, if the unambiguous meaning of 
the bill of sale is that the items included were only those then located on the two acres 
comprising the new address, correct application of such an instrument necessarily 
excludes the horse walker, a multi-ton structure permanently affixed to large, 
subterranean concrete blocks that eventually required the use of heavy equipment to move 
onto the Flint's property. Because of these permanent characteristics, the horse walker 
was affixed to Stone's property. Although, as the trial court noted, the walker was 
connected to the horse barn located on the new address via electrical wiring, that 
connection was much less significant than the walker's physical presence on Stone's 
properly, and could have been severed much more easily. And although the arms of the 
horse walker would pass partially over the Flint's property at their ends were the walker 
rotates, a structure that merely casts a shadow onto a neighbor's property does not 
become part of, or somehow move onto that property. 
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If the construction adopted by the trial court is taken to its logical extreme, the bill 
of sale must be construed not to refer to this horse walker at all (which was, incidentally, 
the only such apparatus in the vicinity), but to some hypothetical machine no longer 
located at the specified address. However, the fact remains that this selfsame horse 
walker—located just outside the Flint's new property line at the time the bill of sale was 
executed—was in fact the one contemplated by the parties, as evinced by its subsequent 
removal to the other side of the Flint/Stone property line. In Ward, the Utah Supreme 
Court held regarding facial ambiguity that "[w]hen determining whether a contract is 
ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered. Otherwise, the determination of 
ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it is based solely on the 'extrinsic evidence of 
the judge's own linguistic education and experience.'" 907 P.2d at 268. Under the Ward 
rule, the horse walker's location and subsequent removal was certainly proper evidence 
for the trial court to consider in determining whether the bill of sale was ambiguous. The 
language of the provision, the walker's location, and its eventual destination are ample 
evidence of ambiguity within the bill of sale. Specifically, they show the existence of a 
dichotomy that must be resolved: does "certain personal property now at 6006 S. 7100 W. 
Hooper, UT" mean only the enumerated items actually located at that address, or does it 
mean something else? (such as "certain other items in the vicinity of the address?") 
The trial court attempted to resolve this issue by implying in its decision that the 
horse walker was "otherwise specifically identified" in the bill of sale. Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law TJ5. While the trial court construed the bill of sale to limit the 
transaction only to "personal properly presently existing on the two acres conveyed," it 
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reasoned that this "specific identification" was the basis for carving out an exception to 
that construction. 
However, this distinction is illusory. Each category of the items at issue 
here—the loafing sheds, panels, gates, waterers, feeders, and horse walker—is 
"specifically identified" in the bill of sale. None of the items is identified in any different 
manner than any of the others. The only real significant distinction between the horse 
walker and the rest is that there existed multiple loafing sheds, panels, gates, waterers and 
feeders—some on the property described by the address, some off—and only one horse 
walker, located outside the two acres. The horse walker referred to in the bill of sale is 
not identified as being off the Flint's property, but is simply another in the list of 
enumerated items. Thus, the bill of sale itself, if construed according to the meaning 
given it by the trial court, provides no basis for an inference that the transaction includes 
anything located off the Flint's property, horse walker or otherwise. Yet, the actions of 
the parties clearly demonstrate that this was the horse walker contemplated in the 
transaction. It is undisputed that the transaction always included the horse walker, which 
was not bargained for separately, or identified in any different manner than any other 
category of item. 
The unavoidable conclusion is that the bill of sale is a facially ambiguous 
document. If construed according to the plain-language requirement advanced by the trial 
court—that the transaction included only items presently existing on the two acres—the 
reader of the bill of sale must ask "to what horse walker does this document refer?" One 
could either infer then that no horse walker was to be included—as none was then present 
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on the property—or that the only horse walker in the vicinity was in fact the one 
described in the document. Either interpretation could reasonably be arrived at. On the 
one hand, the document names a nonexistent, merely hypothetical horse walker (the one 
that should be present on the property, but is not); on the other, it implies that its earlier 
condition—that all items be present on the property—is not really a hard-and-fast rule. 
Either way, a plain-text examination of the bill of sale, in light of the number of horse 
walkers actually in existence on and around the property, leads to unclear results. 
Because of this problem, the bill of sale is facially ambiguous, and the trial court erred by 
disallowing parol evidence to determine the intent of the parties regarding the panels, 
gates, and loafing sheds. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING WITNESSES ON 
RELEVANCE GROUNDS. 
The trial court wrongfully excluded two of the Flints' witnesses at trial. The Flints 
intended to use the testimony of Jeffrey Dean Harris and his wife Vickie Harris, who 
were potential buyers of the same two-acre parcel and farm equipment that Ms. Stone 
sold the Flints. (R. at Vol. 1, pp. 132-141.) The Harris couple found Stone's two-acre lot 
on the multiple listing service and viewed the property with their realtor. At trial, when 
Jeffrey Harris was asked by Flints' counsel what personal property (i.e., farm equipment) 
Ms. Stone stated was included with the purchase of the two-acre parcel, Stone's counsel 
objected on numerous grounds. Id. The court found their testimony irrelevant. The court 
failed to find it relevant to determining what personal property Stone was selling with the 
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two-acre lot, her motive to get rid of the animal-related equipment, her state of mind, her 
intentions, plan or scheme for selling ALL of the farm equipment, or to disprove what she 
claimed in court, that she only intended to sell a portion of the personal property outside 
of the surveyed two-acre plot. 
Ultimately the Court accepted Stone's objection to the testimony. That objection 
was as follows: "Your Honor, they are entirely two different dates, two different 
situations, two different parties. I don't see the connection between the two. But if she 
ever said anything to him, it would not be relevant to the case at hand where we have his 
testimony and his written contract." (R. at Vol. 1, p. 140.) The court responded, "I'm 
going to sustain that, the objection." The whole point of the Harris's testimony was to 
show the consistency of the Flint's testimony and the inconsistency or fallacy of Stone's. 
The Harrises did not receive a different offer than the Flints; they received the same offer. 
Nevertheless the court stated, "even assuming the best scenario for your client. . . she 
made an offer to him, and then days later made a different offer to your client, doesn't 
necessarily mean that the offer she made to him is the same one she made him. People 
change their mind. And I just don't think it's relevant." (R. at Vol. 1, p. 141.) 
The court later stated, speaking of Ms. Stone, "If she said something that she's 
now denying in this trial, and Mr. Flint is contending that it occurred, and she told him, 
then it would be very relevant, because it would be an admission against interest.. . . the 
fact that she makes a different offer to a different person on a different day can't be 
controlling in this case." Id. 
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A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 190 P.3d 1269. A trial court's ruling on 
evidence will be reversed if it was beyond the limits of reasonability. Id. This Court 
should find that the trial court's ruling was beyond the limits of reasonability. "'Relevant 
evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is 
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence." Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 401 (2009). 
It is well understood that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible" and "[e]vidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible." Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 402 (2009). Futher, relevant, 
evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence." Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 403 (2009). 
The trial court did not rely on Rule 403 for its ruling that the Harris' testimony was 
irrelevant. Instead, the court simply found the testimony not relevant because the "the 
fact that she makes a different offer to a different person on a different day can't be 
controlling in this case." (R. at Vol. 1, p. 141.) The trial court misses the mark. The 
testimony was offered to show that Ms. Stone extended to the Harrises the same offer as 
the Flints. Such testimony is relevant to know what Ms. Stone's offer was to the Flints, 
which constitutes an independent act of significance which is not hearsay. Also, it is a 
statement of a party opponent under Rule 801(d)(2). It shows whether the Flints are 
telling the truth about the sale of personal property and Stones lack of propriety in 
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asserting she did not intend to sell ALL the farm equipment with the two acres. Under 
Rule 401, relevance is a low bar. All that need be show is that the evidence has a 
"tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. 
Civ. P. rule 401 (2009). 
If Ms. Stone said to a third party that the same two-acre lot the Flints purchased 
includes all farm equipment on Stone's property, this makes the existence of her intent to 
include in the sale personal property not physically located on the two-acre plot more 
probable, and her statements to the contrary less probable. If Stone intended with more 
than one buyer to include in the sale items not physically located on her property, this is 
relevant. An examination of what Stone said to these potential buyers is highly relevant. 
At minimum, the statements go to the weight of the evidence and assist the trier of fact in 
determining the credibility of the parties' testimonies. Stone's potential sale to the 
Harris's was for the same two acres of real property and their testimony as to what 
personal property was included is not "a different offer". (R. at Vol. 1, p. 141.) 
Therefore, this Court should find that the trial court abused its discretion and hear the 
testimony. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING AND MISSTATING 
CERTAIN SALIENT FACTS FROM ITS FINDINGS OF FACT. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact used facts that supported its conclusion and 
omitted or misstated salient facts which were critical to its ruling. The Court found at Iffi 
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12 and 13 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that only three lounging/loafing 
sheds, and some mobile gates and panels were on Stone's property and in dispute in the 
suit. 
However, the testimony at trial showed a different picture. At the time of the 
closing on the real estate, two feeders, a number of waterers, the horse walker, four 
sixteen foot and eleven ten foot panels, twelve square panels, four mobile gates, and three 
lounging/loafing sheds were physically located on Stone's property. (R. at Vol. 1, pp. 68-
71, 88, 90.) Two feeders, three lounging/loafing sheds and a much smaller number of 
panels and gates were physically located on Flints' property. Id. 
The Flints subsequently took possession of the two acres, as well as the all the 
feeders, waterers and horse walker, all located on Stone's property. Stone raised no 
objection to this, but objected to the Flints taking the gates, panels, and three 
lounging/loafing sheds on Stone's property. (R. at Vol. 1, pp. 145-149; 185-186.) 
The trial court ignored the fact that there was testimony that the waterers and 
feeders were on her property, that the Flint's took possession of them, and that Stone 
never raised this in her suit. It focused on the horse walker and misstated the evidence 
about whether the parties negotiated the horse walker before the sale—in order to explain 
away why the horse walker's expressly being sold in the REPC did not make the contract 
ambiguous. In fact, the opposite was true. 
Ms. Stone, when pinned down on the issue, ultimately agreed that there was no 
discussion about the horse walker before it was included in the REPC on February 1, 
2008, and Mr. Flint testified that they never discussed the horse walker until after the sale 
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when a dispute arose concerning the fifteen acres they lease from Stone. (R. at Vol. 1, pp 
66-68, 145-149, 185-186.) The settlement reached by the parties in dismissing some the 
claims before the trial shows that Stone required that the horse walker be moved in 
February 2009 as part of the settlement negotiations. (R. at Exh. 7; Add. C) This is not 
the same as the trial court's assertion that that negotiations between the parties to 
purchase the horse walker occurred before the contract was made. The court 
misunderstood or misstated the facts and instead inferred that the reason Stone sold the 
horse walker on her real property was because Flints specifically requested it. They did 
not. 
The trial court also found that because the shadow of the horse walker's arms 
passed over the Flint's property—and because the electrical connection for the 
equipment attached to the Flint's barn—the multi-ton structure/fixture located on Stone's 
property somehow became a part of the Flints' properly. Such reasoning is nonsensical. 
It is important that in the settlement agreement, Stone expressly agreed that the horse 
walker was on her property—she also stated such in her trial testimony. (R. at Exh. 7, ^9 
of Confidential General Release and Settlement Agreement; R. at 0032; Vol. 1, p. 125; 
Add. 3.) 
The Court of Appeals should find that the trial court erred by omitting from its 
Findings the fact that feeders and waters were located on Stone's property at the time of 
the sale, but Stone never disputed the Flints' right to these items. Also salient is the fact 
that the parties never discussed the horse walker before it was included in the REPC and 
Bill of Sale. Only after the sale was complete for the two-acre plot and the Flints had 
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leased the fifteen acres did a dispute arise; the horse walker was then part of a discussion 
about which items of personalty Stone would choose to dispute. 
These extrinsic facts are important for the court to determine whether the REPC 
and Bill of Sale are ambiguous. Without knowledge of what was negotiated (or, in the 
case of the horse walker, what was not negotiated), what was physically located on 
Stone's property versus Flints' two-acre plot, and what became in dispute, the Court 
cannot reasonably determine the ambiguity of the REPC and Bill of Sale. The court's 
omission of these facts will be reversed if clearly erroneous. Gilmoiir v. Cummings, 904 
P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1995). In this case, the Flints have marshaled the evidence to 
show that the trial court's Findings at paragraphs 12 and 13 were clearly erroneous. For 
these reasons the court should find that the trial court erred in excluding these facts from 
its Findings. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the Flints (Appellants/Defendants/Counterclaimants) 
respectfully request that the Court of Appeals take the following actions: 
• Find that the REPC, its addenda and final Bill of Sale, are facially ambiguous: 
• Remand the case to the trial court to make findings regarding the 
Defendant/Appellants' intent to buy and Plaintiff/Appellee's intent to sell the 
disputed personal property physically located on Stone's real property following 
the survey and sale of real property (i.e. all farm equipment, including three 
lounging/loafing sheds, and numerous mobile panels and gates) 
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• Order the trial court to hear any necessary parol evidence to deduce the parties' 
intent; 
• Order the trial court to determine whether a contract was formed with respect to 
the disputed personal property and to make findings stating whether there was a 
meeting of the minds concerning these disputed items of personal property; 
• Order the trial court to compensate the Flints for their losses if there was no 
meeting of the minds concerning this disputed property and therefore no contract; 
• Order the trial court to allow the testimony of Jeffrey Dean Harris and Vickie 
Harris, husband and wife, concerning their discussions with Stone relevant to 
whether personal property on her real property is/was included in the sale of the 
two acres of real property eventually sold to the Flints; 
• Find that the trial court failed to recognize that in addition to the three 
lounging/loafing sheds and the horse walker, which were all on Stone's real 
property, two feeders, a certain number of waterers, the horse walker, four sixteen-
foot and eleven ten-foot panels, four mobile gates, and three lounging/loafing 
sheds, as well as twelve square panels were located on Stone's property at the time 
of the sale; that Stone only disputed the ownership of the three lounging/loafing 
sheds and the mobile panels/gates; 
• Award Flints their attorney's fees for this appeal. The settlement agreement 
between the parties expressly allows attorney's fees for resolving this issue 
concerning the ownership interest in the loafing/lounging sheds and panels/gates. 
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Addendum A, f^ 17 of 3 February 2009 
and Settlement Agreement. 
Settlement Confidential General Release 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Brad C. Smith, 6656 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE." 
Bill of Sale 
(WITH WARRANTIES) 
Know all Men by These Presents: 
That Craig D. Stone and Marlene K. Stone as Trustees of The Stone Famiily Revocable Trust U/A 
dated February 1, 2007 the SELLER, for and in consideration of the sum of: Ten Dollars and Other 
Valuable Considerations to _me/us_ in hand paid by Richard Flint and Judy Flint, the BUYER, the 
receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have/has bargained, sold, assigned and transferred, and by these 
presents do/does bargain, sell, assign and transfer unto said BUYER that certain personal property now at 
6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, UT. 84315 WEBER County, State of UT, particularly described as follows: 
Oven/Range, Refrigerator, Window Covering, 2 Water Irrigation Shares, AH Lounging and Loafing 
Sheds, Panels, Gates Feeders, Waterers, and Horse Walker as presently exist 
And the Seller upon the consideration recited above warrants ownership of and good title to said property, 
the right to sell the same and that there are no liens, encumbrances or charges thereon or against the same 
and to defend the title and possession transferred to the BUYER against all lawful claims. 
In Witness Whereof, I/We have hereunto set My/Our hand(s) this 16th day of April, 2008 
mx^Zj^ri/i (l /&<&-
Marlene K. Stone (Trustee) 
ADDENDUM B 
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«AlTOR» REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT & 
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Buyer. 
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of-
/ I j : E A R N E S T ^ N e Y RECEIPT 
„ offers to purehae© foe Property 
fijtt Eaniast Money the amount of & t * UJtTt) in the form  tefDW and hensby deliver? to the Brotareae, a 
which, upon Acceptance of this otfer by all parties (as 
defined in Section 23), shall be deposited in accordance with state law. 
Received by: ^ - -
Brokerage;. 
on. 
/Mhr^ 
(»**) 
Phone Number, 
1. PROPERTY: 
also deactfbed „ ^ ^ ^ ,__,_. _,___,_, . ... . ^ ^ ^ 
City of /TlSk&fA &*£ — ^ - , County o f - j £ ^ J k J 2 j * ^ . state dt tteh Zip g ^ ^ ? / ^ 
1.1 Included Item*. Unleaa excluded herein, this sale include* the following items ff presently owned and attached to 
the Property: plumbing, heating, air conditioning fixtures and equipment; ceiling tans; water Heater, buIMn appliances; light 
fixtures and bulbs; bathroom fixtures; curtain*, diepohee and rods; window and door screens; storm doors and windows; 
window blinds: awnings; installed television antenna; satellite dtehes end system, permanently affixed carpets: automatic 
garage door opener end accompanying transmitter^); fencing; and trees and shrubs. The following items shall also be 
inc*jrd«fCNr> this sate Mid conveyed finder separate Bill of $ate with warrant!** as to titip nyr*^t+jwe
 r 
1*2 Eitcludad Items. The following items are excluded from tnte sale: JL _,-^/ 
_ ^ 1.3JWjter Rights, Tti 
Z, 
he fan 
PURCHASE PRICE, The Purchase Price for ttfe Property is $ 
ing water right* are included In this *»>«; „ ' for ,/m.fv ^ V C- &*lih? c ZYV^f 
.y /g / r,g2zi 
2.f Method of PayjwmL The Purchase Price will b* paid as. fallows 
$ (*) E&rneat Money Daponit Under certain condltl&ns described lit this Contract, THIS 
DEPOSIT WAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDA&LE. 
fbj New Loan. Buyer agrees to apply for a,new loan a* prov&tbd in Section 2,3, Buyer will apply 
for one or more of the following loan*: r / f CONVENTIONAL [ ) FHA [ 1VA 
I } OTHER (specify) • 
If on FHA/VA Joan applies see attached FHA/VA loan Addendum. 
- & — 
^ 
$ 
$ 
(c) 
(•) 
(0 
- •
 r tw,- -,-. - » . a f ^ ^ l 
Loan Assumption Addendum (S«e attacned Assumption Addendumm applicable) 
jd Seller Financing Addendum if applicable) 
k »a 
Seller Financing (aee.flttacrpc 
Other (*pecrty) ^ J g ^ l , . 
Bilance of Purchaa* Pricm In Cafth at Settlement 
PURCHASE PRICE. Total of lim»* (a) through (f) 
2.2 Financing Condition, (check applicable box) 
(a) b^Buyer** obligation to purchase th«f PTOperty IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for the applicable !oan(a) 
• 'referenced in Section 2.1(b) or (c) (the 'Loan"), This condition is referred to ess the "Financing Condition," 
(b) [ ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for a ban. Section 
2v3 does not apply. 
Page 1 of 6 pmges Setter's I n i t i a l ^ S H ^ ^ - Data Q/JM 
B^B Rev ey03 
2.3 Application for Loan. 
|a) Buyer's dutivt. No later than the Loan*Application & Fee Deadline referenced in Section 24{a)T Buyer shall 
apply for the Loan, l o a n Application" occur* onty when Buyer has: (i) completed, signed, and delivered to th* 
lender (the "Lender*) the initial loan application and documentation required by the Lender; and (II) paid ell loan 
application fees as required by the Lender. Buyer agrees to diligently work to obtain the Loan. Suyer will prompt^ 
provide the Lender with any addition^ documentation as required by the Lender, 
(b) Procedure If Loan Application is dented. If Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Lender 
doe* not apprwt the Loan (a "Notice of Loan Dor-war). Buyer shall, no later titan three calendar days thereafter, 
provide a copy to Seller. Buyer or Seller may, uvHhln three calendar daye after Seller* receipt of such notice, 
cancel this Contract by providing written notice to the other party. In the event of a cancellation under this Section 
2.3(b): (I) If the Notice of Loan Denial wa* received by Buyer no later than the Loan Denial Deadline referenced in 
Section 24(d), the Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer {ii) if the Notice of Loan Denial was received 
by Buyer after that date, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Seller, Bjytj Seller agree* to accept as 
Seller^ exclusive remedy the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damage*. A failure to cancel as provided in this 
Section 2,3(b) shall have no effect on the Financing Condition set forth in Section 2.2(a)- Cancellation pursuant to 
the provisions of any other section of this Contract shall be governed by such other provisions. 
2.4 AppMlsaJ Condition. Buyer's obligation to purchase the PropertyftujflS [ ) IS NOT conditioned upon the Property 
appra&infl for not less than the Purchase Phce, This condition is nglwred to ae the -Appral«e( Condition*. If the 
Appraisal Condition apptle* and the Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Property ha* appraised for 
less than ihe Purchase Price (a "Notice of Appraised Vatuew>, Buyer may cancel this Contract by providing a copy of 
such written notice to Seller no later than three days after Buyers receipt of such written notice, in the event of 2 
cancellation under thi$ Section 2,4: (I) If the Notice of Appraised Value waft received by buyer no later than the 
Appraisal Deadline referenced in Section 24(e). the Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer; (0) If the Notice 
of Appraised Value was received by Buyer after thai date, the Earnest Money Deport ahall be released to Seller and 
Seller agrees to accept as Seller's exclusive remedy, the Earnest Money Depoeit a* liquidated damages. A failure tc 
cancel as provided in this Section 2.4 shall he deerrred a waiver of the Apprateal Condition by Buyer Cancellation 
pursuant to the provisions of any other section of this Contract shall be governed oy such other provisions 
3. SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING, 
Settlement shall take place on the Settlement Deadline referenced in Section 24(f), or on o dote upon which Buyer and 
Seller agrae in writing. "Setttemenr shall occur only when all of the following have been competed: (a) Buyer and Seller 
have signed md delivered to each other or to the escrow/dosing offfce all documents required by this Contract, by the 
Lender, by written escrow Instructions ar by applicable law; (b) any monies required to be paid by Buy*r under these 
documents (except for the proceeds of any new loan) have been delivered by Buyer to Seller or to the esciow/downg office 
in the torm of collected or cleared fund©; and (c) any monies required to be paid by Seller under these documents have 
been delivered by Seller to Buyer or to the ©scrowfclosjng office in the form of collected or cleared funds. Seller and Buyer 
shall each pay one-half (?) of the fee charged by the escrow/closing office for its services in the settlement/closing process. 
Taxes and assessments for the current year, rente, and interest on assumed obligations ehail be prorated At Settlement as 
set forth In this Section. Tenant deposits (including, but not limited tox security deposits, cleaning deposits and prepaid 
rents) $riall b* paid or credited by Seller to Buyer at Settlement. Prorations, set forth in this Section shall be made as or the 
Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(f), unless otherwise agreed bo in writing by the parties. Such 
wilting could include the settlement statement. The transaction will be considered closed when Settlement ha$ been 
competed, and when all of the following have been completed: (i) the proceeds of any new loan have been delivered by 
the Ladder to Seller or to the escrow/closing office; and (\i) the applicable Closing documents have been recorded in the 
office of the county recorder. The actions described in parts (») and (ii) of the preceding sentence shall be completed 
within four calendar days of Se&ernent 
4. POSSESSION. SettF^allterivw^ys^^^ [ J .hpui* [ i ^day* aftef-Cloelfig; 
6. CONFIRMATION XK*13EfK?? r~~" ~ i p m ™ — — - - ' " 5 1 I 
[ ^ife Seer 's Initial* 
Pie Listing Agent, 
The 
£SL£3 
-A 
DisCLOSOBETWIhc 
f] Buyer a Initiate 
signing of this Contract: Y 
., represents [^ffeeller [ frEuy«>r[ Iboih-faiytr and Seller 
SLJ- L~ f? n * y a s * Limited Agent; 
Listing Broker, ^S 7/rf-l£.—/Jb&AJtW&4Y... represents P i Seller [ JJEUiyef[ ] both Buyer and Seller 
The Selling Agent _ 
The Silling 
^_^*3fe£tfL as a Limited Agent; represents {-+****?[/) Buyer [ HKUIL Buyei ind Seller 
i o Broker,. , r«pra*enta HMtoHer f / j Buyer [ JbethBuyapend Seller 
D*te_£L3_'4 /_-05( Buyer's i f i l t l a l ^ ^ ^ ^ / ^ — D a t e 2 J l l ^ 3 P*0# 2 of S pages Seller1* lnHiateM / /^ Kfc. 
e/ss R^V 0A53 nFwTTA 1 
6- T l t lE INSURANCE. At Settlement, Salter agrees to pay for a standard-coverage owners policy of title insurance 
insuring Buyer in the aimount of the Purchase Price Any additional title Insurance coverage shall be at Buyer's expense. 
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than the Saner Disclosure Deadline ref«ranO«d m Section 24(b), Seller shall 
provide to Buyer the following documents which are collectively referred to a* the "Seller Disclosures*: 
(Ml a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and doted by Seller; 
(b) 8 commitment for the policy of title insurance; 
(c> a copy of any leases; affecting the Property not expiring prior lo Closing; 
(d) written notice of any claims end/or conditions known io Seller relating to environments problems and building or 
zoning code violations; and 
(«) Other (specify) _
 : 
ft, BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyer's obligation to purchase 
under this Contract (cheek appHcubtt bo*e«): 
(a) y \ IS [ ] 18 HOT conditioned upon Buyer'* approval of the content of all the Setter Disclosures refecenced in Section ?; 
(bj tyftS [ ) IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical condition inspection of the Property; 
(ci'TyflS [ ] IS MOT conditioned upon Buyers approve! ot s survey of the Property by a licensed surveyor ("Survey"}; 
(d) yrfIS [ ] 18 MOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the coat, terms amd availability of homeowner's insurance 
, covenape for the Property; 
(*) y i IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following teste and evaluations of the Property: (specify) 
If any of the above Hems are checked In the affirmative, then Section* 6.1, B.2, 8 3 nnd 8.4 apply; otherwi$e, they do 
not apply. The terns checked in the affirmative above are collectively rotarfed to as the "Evaluation* & Inspections," Unless 
otherwise provided in this Contract, the Evaluations & Inspection* shall be paid for by Bsuyer and shall b& conducted by 
individuals or entities of Buyer's choice. Seller agrees tc cooperate with the Evaluations & Inspections and with the 
walk-through inspection under Section 11. 
fi.1 Evaluation* & Inspections Deadline, No later than ih^ Evaluation* & Inspections Deadline referenced In 
Section 24(c) Buyer ©hall: (a) complete all Evaluations & inspections; and (b) determine if the Evaluations & inspections 
are acceptable to Buyer. 
5.2 Right to Cancel or Object H Buyer rjeletmines that the Evaluations & Inspection* are unacceptable. Buyer may, 
no later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, efcher, (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller, 
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer; or (b} provide Seller with written notice of objections, 
B.3 Failure to Fteapond. ir by th* expiration of the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, Buyer does not: (a) cancel 
this Contract &z provided in Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Evaluations & Inspections, 
the Evaluations & Inspection!; shall be deemed approved by Buyer, 
M Response by Seller, If Buyer provide* written abjections to Seller, Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar 
days after Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections (the "Response Period") in which to agree in writing upon the manner of 
resolving Buyers objections Except as provided in Section 10.2. Seller may, but shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's 
objections. If Buyer and Seller have not agreed in writing upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections, Buyer may 
cancel true Contract by providing written notice to Seller no later than three calendar days after expiration ofUra Response 
Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be Pleased to Buyer. If this Contraa is not canceled by Buyer under 
this Section 8.4, Buyers objections shall fcw dafrmed waived by Buyer. This waiver shall nol affact those items warranted 
in Section 10. 
9, ADDITIONAL TERMS. ThereJ/]ARE (s^VfHr-NOT^ddencia to this Contract containing additional terms. If there 
are, the terms of the following addenda are incorporated into this Contract by this reference! pJ^etfBendum N o . j & k ^ , , . 
[-•f-flhtftaTTInTncinB Addendum M rHJVVA Ltran Addendum [-frAe«Mmfl*ton Aridondfim 
f-j'tttlMSSttiHi Paint Disclosure & Acknowledgement (In some transaction* this di9do»ur* i* required by law) 
J—tttfS^iaifBti PolntAtldenAiw («n some transactions tht* addendum itfWuirfrd tar la*? 
p o t h e r ( * p * c K y ) . X ^ ^ ^ ErH^t_ 
Page 3 of 6 pages Salter's initials JJ^JLteSL:— Date 
ml 
WW ft©V 8/03 
10. SeUJEfc WARRANTIES t REPRESENTATIONS. 
1 <M Condition of Title, Seller represents that Seller has fee title to the Property and win convey good and marketable 
title to Buyer it Closing by general warranty deed. Buyer agrees, however, to accept title to the Property subject to the 
following matters of record: easements, deed restrictions, C C & R ' E (meaning covenants, conditions and restrictions), and 
rights-of-way; and subject to the content* of the Commitment for Titie Insurance as agreed to by Buyer under Section B, 
Buyer also agrees to take the Properly subject to existing leases affecting the Property and not expiring prior to Closing, 
Buyer agree* to be response for tax«*, assessments, homeowners association cues, utilities, and other service* 
provided to the Property after Closing. Except for any loan(s) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section 2.1(c), Sailer 
wW cause to be paid off by Closing all mortgages, trust Geedt, judgments, mechanic'* liens, tax Dene and warrant*. Seller 
will cause to be paid current by Closing all assessments and homeowners association dues. 
10.2 Condition of Property* Seller warrants that the Property will be in the following condition ON THE DATE 
SELLER DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER: 
{*) the Property shall b& broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings. Any Seller or tenant moving-
related Ctamage to the Property shall be repaired at Sailer's expem«; 
(b) the heating, pooling, electrical, plumbing and sprinkler systems and fixtures, and the appliances end fireplaces will 
b* in workhg order and fit for thair intended purposes; 
(cfr the roof &nA foundation ehall be fn&e of leaks known to Seller; 
j<f| any private well or septic lank serving the Property shall have applicable permits, and shall be in working order 
and fit tor Its Intended purpose; and 
(#J the Property and improvements, including tne landscaping, will be in the same general condition as they were on 
the dale of Acceptance. 
10.3 Home Warranty Plan. Ttie "Home Warranty Plan" referenced In this Section 10.3 Is separate from the warranties 
provided by Seller under Section* 10.1 and 10.2 above. (Check applicable boxes): A one-yerar Home Warranty Plan 
hdWlLL-C } WILL NOT be included in this transaction If Inducted, the Home Warranty Plan shall be ordered by LXftuyar 
[ j Sellor andj^eHbe issued by a company selected by p fBuyer H . S i H e ^ T h * cost of the Home Warranty Plan shall 
not excaod S J jL6j -2_ and Shall be paid tor at SattJernant by [ • ] Qtiywt ]A Seller 
11. WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION. Before Settlement, Buyer may, upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable tim*, 
conduct a "walk-through" inspection of the Property to determine only that the Property is "as represented," meaning that 
the items referenced in Sections 1.1, 8.4 and 10.2 ("the tem$M) are respectively prwent, repairedlchangod as agreed, and 
in the warranted condition. If the items are not as represented, Seller will, prior to Settlement, replace, correct or repair 
the Items or, with the consent of Buyer* (and Lender if applicable), escrow an amount At Settlement to provide for the same. 
The failure to conduct a walk-through inspection, or to claim that an item Is not as represented, athall not constitute a 
waiver by Buyer of the right to receive, on the date of possession, the Items as represented, 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Selter agrees, that from the date of Acceptance until the date of Closing, none 
of the following shall occur without the pr\or written consent of Buyer, (a) no changes in any existing leases snail be made; 
(b) no new leases shall &* antered Into; (c) no substantial alterations or improvement* to the Property shell be made or 
undertaken; and (d) no further financial encumbrances to the Property shall be made. 
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust estate, limited liability company, or 
other entity, tne person executing this Contract on its bthatf warrants his or her authority 1O do so and to bind Buyer and 
Seller. 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT This Contract together with Its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures, 
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties, and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, 
representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by 
written agreement of the parties. 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTIONS The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract 
(check applicant* box) 
[ J SMALL 
•£?Q MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES 
first be submitted to mediation, If the parties agree to mediation, the dispute shall be submitted to mediation through 
a mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to bear its own costs of mediation. If 
mediation fells, the other procedures and remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in this Section 15 
shall prohibit any party trom seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation. 
16. DEFAULT If Buyer defaults, Setter may elect either to retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or 
to return it and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this Contractor pursue other remedies available at law. if Seller defaults, 
in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the 
Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Contract or punsufc other 
remedies available at law. If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages. Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to 
Buyer upon demand It is agreed that denial of a Loan Application made by the Buyer Is not a default and is governed by 
Section 2.3(b). 
17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS, In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract, the 
prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. However, ettomey fees snail not be awarded for 
participation in mediation under Section 15. 
1 * . NOTICED Except us provided in Section 23, all nonces required under this Contract must be: (a) in writing; (b) signed 
by the party giving notice; and (c) receded by the other party or th» other party's agent no later than the applicable date 
referenced in this Contract 
19. ABROGATION, Except for the provisions of Sections 10.1, 10.2, 15 and 17 and express warranties made in this 
Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not appty after Closing. 
20. RISK Of LOSS. All risk of loss to the Property, including physical damage or destruction to the Property or its 
Improvements- due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking In sminent domain, shall be 
borne by Seller until the transaction is closed. 
21, TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Ttme Is of the essence regarding the dates aet forth in this Contract Extensions must 
be agreed to in writing by all parties. Unless otherwise expficitfy stated in this Contract: <a) performance under aach 
Section of this Contract which references a date shall absolutely be required by 5;00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date; 
and (b) the term *daysM shall mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the event which 
triggers the timing requirement (i.e., Acceptance. Notice of loan Denial, etc.). Performance dates end linnets referenced 
herein shall not be binding upon tltie companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Contract except as 
otherwise agreed to in writing by such non-party. 
22, FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract, any 
addenda ant counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed fax shall be the same as delivery of an original This 
Contract and any addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts. 
23, ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer ar counteroffer of the other, 
(a) signs the- offar or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the 
othfrf party's agent that lh* offer or counteroffer has been signed as required. 
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES, feuyer and Seller agree that the following deadlines shall apply to this Contract: 
A/M/PIL (Date) {&) Loan Application & tree Deadline 
(by Seller Disclosure Deadlint 
(c) Evaluations & Inspection* Deadline 
(d> Loan Denial Deftdlint 
(©) Apttratal Deadline 
(f) Settlement DeadHns CTt\ <yy^ 
.£.//<?/pSr-
^/*L2dk8l 
Af**,± ( gapg-
(Date) 
(Date) 
(Date) 
- (Date) 
Peg* S of $ pages Seller's Initials 
$f96 R*v &J03 
ltd. Dnte6#—&L"^»( Buyer's Initials 
25. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer otters TO purchase ihe Property on Tta abdK/e terms 
l^Sellc* does not accept this ofler by: ^ : * & I ) AM [J PNJ Mountain "nme on J*? femXi 
/shall lapse; and the Brokerage shall return the Earnest h/Vorfev Deppsit to Buyer. * ? 
r s and conditions. 
(Date), tM* offer 
(Offti Df ( lk *e ff&^ 
ttiOOftor ft*Wrt!r?c# Date" 
{Buy*r»- N»lWf) (PLEASE PRIHT) i^ (tartce Addrett} Cttp Coo*) 
"15SjTof 
*Pmrt«>) 
ACCEF>fANCBCOUMTEROFFeftm^EC"nON 
.CHEpK ONE: 
[ H ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE; Salter Accepts the foregoing otter on the terms and conditions 
v specified above. 
^ I ' f tO lJWI E=R©PPB*l: Seller presents tor Buyer's- Acceptance the terms of Buyer's after subject to the exceptions or 
modifications a* specified in the attached ADDENDUM NQ._ „ 
7&M<Jf/s*+-~d2^& .^^-nz-asr .... ........ • : 
( M f t ' J agnoUire^ <D»ta) {TV* , ( £ * * ( ' » Siottfttufv) (Dfirt*) (Tims) 
fSebw*1 Mpmee) <PLEA*e raw?) 
[ J REJECTION: Seller Rejects the foregoing ofter. 
(No^iC* A M ' * * * ) (Zip cod ») <Phftf>»i 
(&«tar » Siyntfun^ (Dutf) {T*\e) (Sear's SUgtuuuro) (D*tft) (Turn) 
r * » » » * » » » » » » « » * * * W* »TT * * * * * * * * * * * **»•»«• 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
^ t e law require* Bnoker to famish Buyer and Seflej^tfjth copter ofjhis Contract bearing alk signatures. (Fil in applicable 
section below.} ^ s . ~ 
knowledge recelpjt oj &firiat copy of the foiegoing C o W ^ beating all riaria] A/H.ackno l i f A fin l t 
fS*tar*i Signilufej (Do*) (5*rt*fe Sljrwujre) (0*tiy) 
B l personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Contract bearing all signatures to be [ ]faxed [ ] mailed { ] hand 
delivered on . (Date), postage prepaid, to the I I Seller [ J Buyer 
Sent/Delivered by (specify). 
TWTS FORM APPROVED * Y TMC UTAH REAL MTATC COMMISSION AND THE OFftCS o r TflEUIAJt AfTOW^gs^aEfrgftAL, 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST *, JOta IT REFLACEG AMD SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED V^RaiOHS OP T H I B F O R f e ^ 
^age 6 of 6 p*ge& Setter'* Ini t ia l . Buyer1* Initiate 
r 9 m P»g« nc-, 
U S ADDENDUM NO. 
T O »M^«r»Y 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
THIS IS PKH/] ADDENDUM [ lCOUin^jgppFBRtp^hiat REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (th«j'REPC-) with 
an Orter W ^ < » jytosirf _ , — n J Jri/JJQsL , Including All prior atfjtenda and countoroffers, 
bertareem Xf\(&WMVi T V i M y F^**£*lr as Buyer, and — > ^ H ^ ^ ^ y v ^ , C rrD^-JL . «s Sutler, 
regarding the Property located at , £&&&£+* > / ^ Z ^ ^ ^ f e ^ t ^ , The 
fofiowlng terms are hereby Incorporated 8$ partltf life RE PC* 
£cS/ur-h Art i*> /?fitf?+.Jy <Zcv~ise. y •<• tJ >j- (jfj j ^ r - t?J>t-«-*-r^ . ?/*?-£« J 
i>v ^-tg-Z/tf/-" ' ' 
BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC 
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): f J REMAIN UNCHANGED [ ] ARE CHANGED A8 FOLLOWS: 
To the wctent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including eH prtor adden-
da-^™* counteroffers, these terms shall control. AB other twmsoMhe REPC, including all odor addenda and counteroffers. 
rfot modified by this ADDENDUM final remain the same. [ ) SfeJItor [ ] Buyer shall h«v& until [ ) AM [ ] PM 
'Mountain Time or „ {DateL to accept the terms of ms ADDENDUM in accordance with the provisions at Section 
23 orlhe REPC. LJnlsss so accepteff, the after are set forth ih this ADDENDUM i 
'•v^r-jasryr^ 
jB w I )Setei Signature' Date Tint* [ Yjfovm \ ytd^hfthun " » K Tiro* 
ACCEPTANCE/COUMTE^OFPERmEJECTlON 
CHECK ONE: 
ACCEPTANCE: [ J Seller [ ) Buyer hereby accepts theiwrns of thte ADDENDUM. 
[ J COUNTEROFFER: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer presets a* a counteroffer m* terms of attached ADDENDUM NO FFER U rasw 
[ 1 REJECTION: [ ) Seller'[ J Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
THIS F W M AP^rtOVED BY tHE UTAH RCAL ESTATE CONWHSSION AND TMtt OFFICE OF THg UTAH ATTOfcNSY GENERAL, 
EFrfcCTiVE AUOUSf 6. 2«J^, IT RfEPt,ACBL5 AND fiUPl^S£De& ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVEiD VERSIONS OF THIS FORI*. 
UARFormZ 
ft^*«wiivoci 
—L v-^ Pay / o f j l ^ 
H ADDENDUM NO. /^JZ> „ . * . 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT « « « * 
THIS IS AH [^ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER totoai REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC) with 
an C ^ r Reference Date af— —«»„ Z2ff/&JT ineturiinffj]iiprinr ^ d e n d a ^ p counteroffer^ between 
^ ^ f t * w y t y - J ^ j j U ^]I<YT\ as^uver, and
 r ^ / ^ « » f * / g ^ , j £ f e J ^ . a$ Setter, 
regarding th* Property located at Qr^P faSri \ 7 ffm 7* 7
 v^/>^r^L^ . Th* 
following terms aro hereby incorporated ae part, ol the REPC: 7 
1. OPTION TO KEEP HOUSE ON MARKET {TIME CLAUSE") 
11 Right to Accept Othar Otters. Buyer and Sailer agree that Seller may continue to offer the Property for saia end 
to accept other offers subject to the rights of Buyer I A provided below. K Seller accepts any such offers, Salter will notify 
Buyer in writing within OT^-C" ( / ) calendar days After gn^inn into
 Bueh a contract 
1.2 Right to Remove Condition*, Buy»er *haII have * &*\^. L*fhounj after receipt of Seller's written notice in 
which to either: (a) agree in writing to remove from the REPC the following condition(e) (check applicable bo*ec): 
txf Financing Condition; reappraisal Condition; yiEvaluations 8, Inspections; jMf Subject to the Sale of Buyers 
rtesldftnaa: [ ] Other (explain): _ _ _ W i _ t a - ^ . „ ~--—-^^^^_ 
or (b) by teMIng to respond in writing to Sellers notice, allow the REPC to automatically become canceled, in which 
instance, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer. 
BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADUNES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC 
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX)! [ J REMAIN UNCHANGED [ } ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS: 
To the extant the term*; of ihte ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda 
and counteroffers, these tornic shall control All other tercm ojjhe REPC, including all prior addejjdagpd countetoffers, 
not modified by this ADDENDUM- shaU> remain the se>rne, j ^ S S l e r [ ) Buyer shall have until , , > r ^ L J AM V\ PM 
Mountain Time on ><' fZ/fp/^.. (Date), to accept the term* of this ADDENDUM in accorded with 
/Ohe provtekm of Section 23p^theJ$EPC, Unless so accept^tfheyd^^&et forth irOhiy ADDEI^tlM shall lapse. 
Buyer [ j Seller Signature (Date*(Time) f^BuyjSffi 1Softer Stature T (Data) (Tima) 
ACCErHTU^E/COUKrefco!^^ P 
(ACCEPTANCE: { J Sailer [ ] Buyer hereby accept* (he terms of this ADDENDUM. 
I ) COUNTEROFFER: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO,. 
'?'%;/&{Ate** J$™JU, s?£-*J-a$r 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Data) (Tima) 
I ] REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ 1 Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
(Signature) (Da**) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
THIS POM* APPROVED BY THE UTAH ttftAL ESTATE COWI(l»«DN AND THE OFFICE OF THE UT*H ATTORNEY GENERAL. 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 20*3, IT REPLACE5 AND SUP£Rft£0£8 A t L P&EVtOOSLY APPriOVEO VERHON& OF THIS FOfflK, 
Peo* i of 1 Soiled IriklalQJL^j^jr Burr's lfiMmls____"- / Addendum Nc. to REPC 
H5&W" 
ADDENDUM NO. 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
Page of 
fmt 
ADDENDUM [ ) COUNTEROFFER J it REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with 
a i ^ ^ ^ e f ^ e n c e D a ^ f ^ . JPx/f /OS's including aJ^ Pri or ^ddend^pqrf counteroffers, between 
reoardmg the Property located at QrtttC* <b f 
, *ftd, 
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC: 
1. SUBJECT TO SALE OF BUYER'S RESIDENCE 
irw5  
re*-*. , 
Z2jti£ZU^t /^nertfUkx: 
as Seller. 
,^_. The 
^ 
s 
UiePrj Is conditioned upon the 
JSL£S8=: .{the 
1.1 Subject to SHI* of Buyer's Ratldenc*. Buy&rs obJiaaWon to pwrchi 
closing of the sal* of Buyer's residence located at:
 L *^&< S^T &s£& 
(the -Residence") by 5500 P.M. <MST) on the , . , . _ / l t day of 
"R&stdence Closing Deadline*). 
1.2 Strtu*. Buyer [ ) DOES fVboES NOT have a signed contract far the sate of the Residence, Tte Residence 
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1.3 Right to Cancel If the sale of the Residence is not closed by the Residence Casing Deadline, Buyer or Seller 
may, within three calendar days after Die Residence Closing Deadline, cancel the REPC by providing written notice to the 
other parry. In the event of such cancellation, toe Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer, Buyer rrjay howeverr, 
remove thla condition at amy time prior to the Residence Closing Deadline by providing written notice to Seller. 
BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC 
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): [ J REMAIN UNCHANGED [ ) ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS: 
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict wHh any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda 
and counteroffers, these terms fchall control. All other termjpf the REPC. including an prior addeojijLaad counteroffers, 
not modified by thte ADDENDUM shM rerpain the earn*, y\ Sailer I J fcuyer shall have until S*^* [ ] AM j\TpM 
jntaln Time on ^/Jil/o/f (Date), to acpapt the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with 
Section 2<S$t1tet REPC. Unless so accfcRted, lije^otf^r-^T^t forth irvfffe ^DDENDljM shall lapse. 
y^CHECKONE: 
(^r^^ApCEPTANCE: [ ] belter \ J Buyer hereby accepts me terms of this ADDENDUM. 
y^CtHJHyEROrrCR: [ ] Seller [ ] Buy*r presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO.; 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) 
[ ] REJECTION: [ \ Seller [ } ©uy*r rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
(Date) (Time) 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
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ADDENDUM NO. 4 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
\ 
TH»S IS AN fX] ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with 
an Offer Reference Date of February 1. 20flfi Including all prior addends and counteroffers, between £Uut as Buyer, 
and SlQDfe a* Seller, regarding the Property located at 6006 S . 7100 W. Hooper. Utah B4315. The following terms 
nr* hartby incorporated as part of the REPC: 
1). The confirmation of agency disclosure referenced in section 5 of the R.E.P.C, shall be charged 
as follows; The Listing agent shalLfre MiKe Bowman and the listing broker shall bg Realty Link, LI 0 
who both represent the seller. The Selling agenland selling broker who represents the buver shall 
pajnain..tti^5ampl 
All, other .terms, to remain the same, 
BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC 
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): [X] REMAIN UNCHANGED [ J ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS:
 m 
To tha extent the terms of this ADDENDUM m&dtty or conflict with any provision* of the REPC, Including all prior addenda 
amd counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC including all prior addenda «nd counteroffers, 
not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [ ] Seller [XJ Buyer shall have until £:Q0 [ ] AW [X] PM 
Mountain Time on Fetamary fl ?0QB (Date), to accept the terms or this ADDENDUM in accordance with the provislona 
of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, thB offer as sert forth in thte ADDENDUM ahall lapse. 
fTjOMtMi .dTjThC - _ 
[ ] Buyer [ft Seller Signature (Date) (Tim*) f ] Buyer [ J Belief Signature (Date) (Time) 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFERfflEJICTION 
CHpCKONE:
 / " N . 
/ y f ACCEPTANCE: [ J Seller V/\ Buyer hereby acraptMh^rm* of this ADDENDUM. x 
/ /^COUNTEROFFER; Ltoa l ieA J Buyar presents as /ccforfebffer the term™? attached ADDENDUM NO. , 
•6d3^uiv-j^i Woe [TI^^F x£r 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) i Uffiaturef/ ^ ^ (Date) (Time) 
"[-J REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects the foregoii 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THi UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND TH£ OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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THIS IS AN Y\ ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT {the "REPC") with 
an Offer Reference Date of, including; ait prior addends and counteroffers, 
between JPlrtrTT^L a* Buyer, and C / ^ ' V £ i L . as Seller, 
regarding the Property located at —_ _ The 
following terms are hereby incorpcwatftd as pert of the REPC; 
pern 8* —/ff r f / y -^U (7^> j^r rt***^ ?U~ s*-*nt . 
BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFEREHCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC 
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): [ ] REMAIN UNCHANGED [ J ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS: -
To the axtent the terms of tills ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC. including att prbr adden-
da and counteroffers, these terms shall control. AH other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, 
not modified by thfeADDENIDUM&liaJI remain the same, ( \ SelkK^ ] Buyer shall have until [ ]AM[ JPW 
^fountain Time on (Dale), to accept the terms of W& ADDENDUM Mi accordance with the provisions of Section 
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CHECK ONE 
\'/\ ACCEPTANCE: [ ] S*l»€r [ ] Buyvr hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM. 
[ 1 COUNTEROFFER: [ jSelw [ ] Buyer piesents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO.. 
feipnituet) (Date) (Dmef (5ipn*k«^) (Data) (n™} 
I ] REJECTION: f J Sailer [ J Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
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ADDENDUM C 
Confidential General Release and Settlement Agreement 
BECITALS 
This action was commenced In the Second Judicial District Courr of Weber 
County, State of Uteh, by Plaintiff, Marieen Stone, in which she sought eviction of 
Defendants ana Counter Plaintiffs, Richard and Judy Flint, from leased property 
pursuant to claims of waste. The Defendants responded to this allegation and brought 
counter claims against the Plaintiff on three grounds: 
1, Trespass 
2, Breach of Contract and/or Conversion 
3, Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment (i.e., property warranty) 
Pursuant to the following Settlement Agreement, STONE expressly agrees to 
drop her lawsuit against FLINT and FLINT agrees to drop the First Cause of Action, 
Trespass, from the suit, These items will be dismissed with prejudice within seven (7) 
days of signing this agreement, The parties herein stipulate that the only remaining 
issues for the court are whether three (3) sheds and several non-fixed mobile panels on 
STONFS property are part of a Bill of Sale and Real Estate Purchase Contract, both 
dated 16 April 2008. 
This Confidential General Release and Settlement Agreement shall 
hereinafter be referred to as the "Agreement," 
1. RICHARD AND JUDY FLINT (FLINT), their heirs, successors, 
administrators, agents and representatives, shall hereinafter be referred to, jointly and 
individually, separately and collectively, as FLINT, 
2, MARLENE STONE her partners, parents, subsidiaries, divisions, 
branches, and affiliates (the foregoing shall be collectively referred to as STONE), and 
each of their incorporators, directors, officers, owners, shareholders, servants, agents, 
employees, former employees, attorneys and representatives, and the successors, 
heirs and assigns of each of the foregoing, and any person, pannership, corporation, 
association, organization or entity now or previously acting, directly, in the interest of or 
on behalf of MARLENE STONE shall hereinafter he rBierred to, jointly and Individually, 
separately and collectively, as STONE. 
3, The parties hereby agree to stipulate that the legal ownership of the sheds 
and non-fixed mobile panels are the sole and remaining issues which are scheduled for 
a trial on 15 April 2009. 
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4. On 1 January 2009, the parties agree that FLINT removed aff animals, 
belongings, materials, farm equipment, and any other personal property belonging to 
FLINT from off of the property of STONE, which is the subject of a lease dated 16 April 
20D8 (15 acres adjoining and on the North and East of the FLINT property), 
5. It is expressly acknowledged that white the duration of said lease was 
from 17 April 2008 to 17 April 2009, the lease expired per agreement of the parties 
effective on 2 January 2009, 
6. STONE herein agrees to pay FLINT the sum of $559.00 for the prorated 
remainder of the lease ($569 - $1,889,25/yr + 365 days/yr x 108 days remaining for 
lease period) within seven (7) days of the signing of this Agreement by the parties. This 
number will be further reduced by an amount of $40 per month for each month that the 
horse walker remains on STONE'S property. The parties agree that $80 of the above V 
sum will be withheld from the $559 payment listed above to ensure such $40 per month 
payment for a period of two months. 
7. The parties hereby agree not to disparage one another, specifically 
including statements about the other to neighbors, friends, or church members af the 
FLINTS; further, the parties mutually agree to keep the terms and conditions of this 
agreement confidential, subject to the exceptions in-numbered paragraph 23 below. 
8. STONE hereby acknowledges and agrees to the terms and conditions of 
the Joint Motion for Stipulated Temporary Injunction (I.e. three years, or until STONE 
sells her property* which ever is longer) and the proposed Order submitted to the court 
that is attached hereto, 
9. It Is hereby acknowledged that there Is a horse walker that is located on 
the STONE'S real property but which is the property of FLINT pursuant to a 16 April 
2008 Real Estate Purchase Contract and accompanying Bill of Sale of the same date. 
This statement is in no way an admission concerning the rightful ownership of the 
loafing sheds or any remaining property on the STONE'S land and which the FLINTS 
cialm an interest in by virtue of said contracts. 
10. FLINT agrees to remove said horse walker by 30 January 2009. FLINTS 
also agrees to cap the electrical line to the pasture electrical fence also by said date 
and STONE agrees to cap and/or sever any connections from her electric fence that go 
onto the FLINTS' property by said date, 
11. It is expressly agreed that STONE shall have no nght to any utilities 
presently existing on her property but that are attached and/or coming from the FLINT 
property, This includes, but is not limited to, any electrical, water or sewer. It is 
expressly agreed that the electrical lines for the horse walker will remain underground* 
As part of the deconstmction and/or movement qf the horse walker, FLINT herein 
agrees to cap the exposed electrical lines and bury them underground where they 
/ 
currently exist. Furthermore, FLINT agrees to disconnect the electncal line to the horse 
walker, at the point it comes above ground on FLINT'S property. 
12. To the extent there are other issues to work out between the parties 
regarding the ownership or right to use utilities, including but not limited to gas, 
electrical, irrigation or potable water lines on either party's property, this Agreement 
does not address such Issues which am not currently before the court. 
13. The parties hereby expressly agree to comply with the requirements of the 
court with respect to contact with one other. 
14. This Agreement constitutes a partial settlement of the claims between the 
parties. 
15* The parties acknowledge that their properties adjoin each other and that 
for signrficant sections of the property line there is no fence, or there are fences or other 
structures traversing through the mutual property tine. As a result, the parties recognize 
that there will be continued need in the future to resolve disputes either between these 
parties or their successors in interest. 
16. This Agreement in no way affects the property rights of the parties with 
respect to either real property or personal property not at issue in this current lawsuit. 
This includes, but is not limited to, FLINTS' tnteresi in two or more shares of Irrigation of 
the Wilson Hooper Water line purchased by the FUNTS from STONE. However, it Is 
the intent of the parties T.o work together through their respective counsel to resolve any 
future disputes concerning the common property lines and the structures that may be in 
common as well. 
17. Each party will bear their own attorney's fees and costs tor all matters 
settled herein. The parties expressly reserve the right to request the fees and costs for 
litigation for the remaining issue concerning the ownership interest of the loafing sheds. 
18. This release Is purposefully broad, and it is Intended to capture any 
conceivable claim which the parties have against each other or their agents excluding 
these specifically preserved herein. 
19. The parties warrant and represent that they have not sold, assigned, 
granted, or transferred to any other person, corporate or natural, any claims [/ 
encompassed by this Agreement that he has, had, or may have at any time in the 
future, or claims to have or have had against the other party. 
20. All negotiations relating to this Agreement are merged herein, There are 
no promises, agreements, conditions, undertakings, warranties, or representations, oral 
or written, express or implied, among FLINT and/or STONE as to such matters other 
than as set forth herein, No waiver, change, or modification of this Agreement shall be 
valid unless the same Is In writing and is signed by the party to be bound thereby. 
V 
• ^ 
: / 
21. The singular number, when used herein, includes the plural, and vice-
versa, as the context may require. The masculine, feminine, and neutral genders shall 
include such other genders as are appropriate. 
22. If any term or other provision of this Agreement is invalid, illegal, or 
incapable of being enforced by any rule of law or public policy, all other conditions and 
provisions of this Agreement nevertheless shall remain in full force and effect. 
23. The confidentiality provisions of this Agreement shall not, however, apply 
to prevent STONE or FLINT from advising its attorneys, tax return preparers, financial 
advisors, and/or government tax agencies of the settlement of the claims and the 
consideration received therefore. To the extent that FLINT or STONE; disclose such 
Information to Its attorneys, tax return preparers, financial advisors, andyor government 
tax agencies, they shall advise those persons of the confidentiality provisions of this 
Agreement. Nothing herein prevents the parties from disclosing this agreement, Its 
terms and conditions, In litigation, in a court of law, or In an alternative dispute 
resolution proceeding, 
24. The parties agree to maintain and/or not remove survey stakes or markers 
on their property. This is not a ratification cf said survey, or a waiver of any claim or 
right, but merely a good faith agreement to maintain the alleged boundary for the 
benefit of both parties to this agreement. To the extent that such markers or stakes 
have bean removed by STONE'S animals or otherwise, the parties agree to replace the 
same if the original location is known to them and it is located on their Individual 
property, This does not give either party the right to trespass onto the other's property 
to move or replace a stake. 
25. This Agreement shall in all respects be interpreted, enforced, and 
governed by and under the laws of the State of Utah. The parties agree to pay all 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in enforcing this Agreement, 
26. This Agreement contains the entire agreement, understanding and 
stipulation between the parties hereto. The terms of this Agreement are contractual, 
and not a mere recital, and may be enforced in court Any waiver by STONE or FLINT 
of a breach or violation of any provision of this Agreement shall not be construed as a 
waiver of any other provision or of any subsequent breach or violation of the 
Agreement. • This Agreement is deemed to have been drafted jointly by the parties. 
Any uncertainty or ambiguity shall not be construed for or against any party based on 
attribution of drafting to any party. 
27. The parties are encouraged to consult with an attorney of their choice 
before signing this Agreement. 
28. The parties agree that they are entering into the Agreement knowingly, 
willingly, and voluntarily, and that no promises, representations, or Inducements not 
expressly set forth herein were made to them that caused them to sign the Agreement. 
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THE PARTIES ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY HAVE READ AND FULLY 
UNDERSTAND THE MEANING AND INTENT OF ALL OF THE PROVISIONS AND 
TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE FINAL BINDING EFFECT. 
WITNESS my signature on this &(r\/} day of M. 2009. 
Q/a/d^ 
iand Flint 
t T 1 
/ 
arisen Stone 
'jWx £U£-
Date 
Date ' / 
DateT / 
Brad C. Smith, No. 6656 
David B. Stevenson, No. 12244 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Tel.: (801) 394-4573 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARLENE STONE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD FLINT AND JUDY FLINT, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD FLINT AND JUDY FLINT, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
MARLENE STONE and Does 1-5, 
Counterdefendants. 
JOINT MOTION FOR STIPULATED 
TEMPORARY INJUNCTION 
Civil No. 080907234 
•J T 7 /) ~J / 
Judge: Michael D. Lyon 
Come now Defendants/Counterclaimants (hereinafter "Defendants"), Richard 
Flint and Judy Flint, by and through counsel, David Stevenson, and 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant (hereinafter "Plaintiff), Marlene Stone, by and through' 
counsel, Isaac Macfariane, and moves the Court for a temporary injunction by 
stipulation of the parties and requests that an injunction issue enjoining 
Counterdefendant, Marlene Stone, and/or her agents from the following: 
1. From trespassing on Defendants' property, located at 6006 S. 7100 West in 
Hooper, Utah, and having serial number Serial # 10-124-0001. Plaintiff is 
enjoined from being on any part of Defendants' property, including, but not 
limited to, their driveway and unpaved surfaces, private sidewalk adjoining their 
porch, and/or their home. 
2. Plaintiff is enjoined from contacting Defendants in any way, including, but not 
limited, direct in-person contact, over the telephone, through the internet, at their 
places of employment, or otherwise. This also includes any contact through an 
agent of the Plaintiff, except for Plaintiff's attorney, real estate agent, or police 
officer. 
3. From parking or driving on Defendants' property. 
4. From any stalking behavior, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101 et seq. 
By stipulation, the parties motion that the Court issue a temporary injunction 
through the attached order, and that said injunction exist for three years or until such 
time as Plaintiff sells her adjoining property lying immediately to the North and East of 
Defendants' property, whichever is longer, and with respect to each and every item 
listed above. 
(pNSONJI S W H , P.C. 
/ )A/ XS 
David B. Stevenson 
Attorneys for Richard and Judy Flint 
ER & ASSOCIATES, P 
4-c- QJhA 
C. Macfarlane 
ftorney for Marlene Stone 
Brad C. Smith, No. 6656 
David B. Stevenson, No. 12244 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Tel.: (801) 394-4573 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARLENE STONE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD FLINT AND JUDY FLINT, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD FLINT AND JUDY FLINT, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
MARLENE STONE and Does 1-5, 
Counterdefendants. 
ORDER FOR TEMPORARY 
INJUNCTION 
Civil No. 080907234 
Judge: Michael D. Lyon 
The parties, Defendants Richard Flint and Judy Flint and Plaintiff Marlene Stone, 
by and through their respective counsel, having moved the Court for a temporary 
injunction by stipulation, and having found good cause for issuing said termporary 
injunction, it is therefore ORDERED and DECREED that Plaintiff, Marlene Stone, 
and/or her agents are temporarily enjoined: 
1. From trespassing on Defendants' property, located at 6006 S. 7100 West in 
Hooper, Utah, and having Serial # 10-124-0001. Plaintiff is enjoined from being 
on any part of Defendants' property, including, but not limited to, their driveway 
and unpaved surfaces, private sidewalk adjoining their porch, and/or their home. 
2. Plaintiff is enjoined from contacting Defendants in any way, including, but not 
limited, direct in-person contact, over the telephone, through the internet, at their 
places of employment, or otherwise. This also includes any contact through an 
agent of the Plaintiff, except for Plaintiff's attorney, real estate agent, or police 
officer. 
3. From parking or driving on Defendants' property. 
4. From any stalking behavior, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101 et seq. 
Said injunction shall exist for three years or until such time as Plaintiff sells her 
adjoining property lying immediately to the North and East of Defendants' property, 
whichever is longer, and with respect to each and every item listed above. 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
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Q Okay. 
A I probably would have if I knew for sure they were 
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MR. STEVENSON: Your Honor, would you give me just a 
second? 
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1QC, 
counter-plaintiff in this case would ask the court to 
consider a motion as a matter of law on a couple of bases: 
One, that first the contract itself, the plain language of 
the contract includes all the loafing sheds and all of the 
panels. 
THE COURT: All the loafing sheds on the property at 
6006 South. That's what the contract says. 
MR. STEVENSON: Yes. That's what the contract says. 
And, at the time prior to the sale, that constituted all of 
the -- that was the property for both sides. And the 
contract that was entered in --
THE COURT: The Bill of Sale was made contemporaneous 
with the sale of the real property, doesn't it? 
MR. STEVENSON: Yes. And that matched verbatim to 
the original REPC that also had the same language. It's 
intended from the beginning, Your Honor, we believe — 
THE COURT: They weren't buying all 17 acres, 
counsel? They were only buying 2 acres? 
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, Your Honor. The evidence that's 
been put on so far has, we believe, will show as a matter of 
law that the language is plain on its face and that the four 
corners, the intent from looking at the four corners of this 
document so that Miss Stone intended to include the horse 
walker and all panels and sheds. And even if this court does 
not so find that the plain language is unambiguous, the 
196 
evidence that's been proffered today shows that as a matter 
of law that the, that there is ample evidence that shows the 
parties' intent through panels, gates, parole evidence and 
the documents in this manner to satisfy the elements of a 
breach of contract action and conversion. 
In addition, our clients put on evidence of damages for 
both of those causes of action, including mentioning that he 
wished to be awarded his attorney's fees and costs and interest 
in this action. For these reasons, we would ask the court to 
rule in our favor on a motion as a matter of law. 
THE COURT: I'm going to take your motion under 
advisement. We are going to -- I would like to have a chance 
to go through all of the evidence before I rule on either of 
your motions. What I anticipate is that I'll give you a 
chance to come back and to further oral argue everything, if 
you would like. I didn't anticipate that just what you made 
was now your closing argument. Do you want anything further 
to say? 
MR. STEVENSON: Your Honor, I don't believe it's 
necessary to do any further closing argument at this point. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Neeley, what is your intent? 
MR. NEELEY: Well, Your Honor, I assumed that we were 
coming back based on what the court said. I think you wanted 
us to take a look at the law and argue points and law to the 
court and relate that to the facts of the case. So, I guess 
i 01 
April 20, 2009. Ogden, Utah. 
PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT: Good afternoon, folks. 
MR. STEVENSON: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Record may show this is the time set for 
oral arguments in the matter of Marlene Stone vs. Richard and 
Judy Flint. 
Since this is your counterclaim and you have the 
burden, I'll allow you to go first. Thank you. 
MR. STEVENSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, 
first, we just appreciate the chance to make one final legal 
argument. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. STEVENSON: And, Your Honor, because there is two 
issues here, first is whether the contract itself was 
ambiguous then, second, if it was, what the facts were in 
this case. I'm planning on just reciting after we discuss, 
first, some of the key facts in this case and why you should 
rule in favor of the Flints, Your Honor. 
Your Honor, this is simply a contract interpretation 
issue that the court has to decide. And, first, the question 
is, was the contract, the Bill of Sale and the REPC, did it 
give, did it define the personal property that was to go with 
the real property? Or did the initial contract, was it 
undefined as to both? That's one of the questions that the 
?nc, 
court has to determine. 
Your Honor, this court should find, first, that the 
Bill of Sale and the REPC which stated that all sheds and 
4 I panels, waterers, feeders, the horse walker, that we would 
5 assert to the court, that this is -- this is something, 
6 certainly, something the court could find as unambiguous. 
7 The court could find that when it says "all" in the context 
8 of the property being sold when it was unidentified, where 
9 the property was, that it intended to include all the 
10 personal property regardless of whether the entire real 
11 property was included in the sale. 
12 Secondly, there's been -- let me point out the three 
13 cases I believe that identify this point and give, I guess, 
14 some direction to the court on determining which way to go. 
15 First is the Flores vs. Earnshaw case which we discussed last 
16 week, which specifies simply that when you are doing a contract 
17 interpretation, the meaning intent, when interpreting the 
18 meaning intent, you consider the provisions in relation to all 
19 others. Where the language of the four corners is unambiguous, 
20 the intentions are determined from the plain meaning as a 
21 matter of law. 
22 If it is ambiguous, then the court considers 
23 extrinsic evidence. The question really is under that case 
24 law, is this section, this Bill of Sale and REPC. Is it 
25 capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of 
1 uncertain meanings and terms, missing terms or other facial 
2 deficiencies? And, Your Honor, we would assert that it seems 
3 fairly clear in this case that all, referring to all panels 
4 and all sheds, did refer to all those items that were 
5 potentially in sale. The real property was not determined at 
6 that point. 
7 I Second case that we believe comes into play is Spears 
& vs. Warr, which was partially abrogated with regard io its 
9 standard of review. But, basically, Spears vs. Warr stood for 
10 the proposition that you can't enter in parole evidence unless 
11 there is an ambiguity in the final documents, or there exists, 
12 the existence of rights which are collateral to the original 
13 contract. 
14 Now, it's unclear whether Flores vs. Earnshaw changes 
15 that in any way, but to the extent that law still applies, 
16 and it doesn't appear that the supreme court has overturned 
17 it on that principle, we urge the court to find that, I guess 
18 when it boils down to it, was there ambiguity in the final 
19 documents? Was there ambiguity in either the REPC or the 
20 Bill of Sale? And I guess, Your Honor, I think it's clear 
21 that there is, there is more than one interpretation that can 
22 be made here. 
23 One interpretation is that Miss Stone actually gave 
24 up every bit of personal property regardless of where her 
25 real property lied. Another --
THE COURT: Let me ask a question about that. As I 
2 I look at the REPC, and clause 1.1 is entitled "Included 
3 items,1' it says, "Unless excluded herein, this sale includes 
4 the following items that are presently owned and attached to 
5 the property." 
6 The property, of course, is not all 17 acres, is it? 
7 I It's just the 2 acres that they were purchasing. Because up 
above, on paragraph one, it says the property is 6006 South 
7100 West. Also described as 2 acres with a barn -- horse 
lOt barn and a hay barn. So, as I read that, doesn't that narrow 
11 the scope of what is the property that the parties are 
12 contracting for? And, therefore, when you talk -- so, if 
13I that's the property, it's the 2 acres, it's not the 17 acres 
14 and, therefore, when you get down to 1.1 where it's the 
15 included items that are attached to the property, and the 
16 property being 2 acres, not 17 acres, how do you then, you 
17 know, reach out and include personal property that's not part 
18 of the sale of the real property? 
19 MR. STEVENSON: Your Honor, the other 15 acres 
20 besides the 2 acres, I don't think there's much dispute that 
21 beyond the items that are in question here, those aren't 
22 generally out on the horse pasture. Those aren't — that's 
23 just not in that area. If you look at the pictures that have 
24 been provided as part of the record, the 15 acres, with the 
25 exception of the 66 feet right-of-way, there is nearly 
nothing out there. It's -- all of these items, if you and I 
were to look at them out the window, they are going to look 
very close, all of the gates and panels. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. STEVENSON: And the sheds, they are going to look 
very close. ItTs not like you have a couple sheds that are 
together, then others that are several acres away. It's not 
that, Your Honor. The other 15 acres, essentially, has no 
other buildings on it. So, Your Honor, I guess the first 
question on whether the original Bill of Sale and whether the 
REPC is unambiguous, I guess, we are going to have to concede 
that, at least, at least it is subject to the interpretation, 
you know, other than one way to see it. 
Of course, my client's testimony means all, means 
all. They looked at all the items of personal property were 
supposed to be included in the sale. Evidence of that as 
shown in the trial was that the statement of Joe Adair that 
all these items are included. It all goes. Her, the 
statement, you know, that it all stays. Then there was an 
additional — there was testimony put on that Mrs. Flint 
spoke directly about each item with Mrs. Stone. Well, the 
question is, what would have been an absolutely unambiguous 
statement if the REPC or the Bill of Sale were perfectly 
unambiguous, what would, it have included? It probably would 
have said all six sheds. It would have said all 30 panels 
1 instead of just three that the Flints ended up getting. It 
2 would have said panels or, I guess, gates. It probably would 
3 have said all personalty or farm equipment including, then it 
4 listed the same items. 
5 I think, Your Honor, if there was a way to make it 
6 completely unambiguous, that would have made it completely 
7 unambiguous. So, to the extent there is a possible other 
8 interpretation, we do feel that the court, you know, both 
9 Spears vs. Warr and Flores vs. Earnshaw point to the fact 
10 that if there is some ambiguity, then you could look at 
11 parole evidence. 
12 In this case, because the client, I mean the 
13 plaintiff and counter-defendant, is challenging the contract 
14 to the degree saying the contract didn't state that you get 
15 all the panels, it didn't state that you get all of the 
16 sheds, now we have to put on parole evidence of it. And let 
17 me ask first, Your Honor, to take note of the things that the 
18 plaintiff and counter-claimant didn't, did not put on. 
19 They didn't put on any evidence that there was a 
20 condition precedent. They didn't say the items of personal 
21 property listed are subject to a survey. It didn't say that. 
22 J Second, they didn't produce the agent or broker to refute the 
evidence that we put on through a broker and two other parties 
24 1 Third, their agent nor Miss Stone corrected the Bill of Sale. 
25 They didn't correct the former REPC. They didn't correct the 
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1 five addendums. In fact, the parties have five addendums here, 
2 There is multiple opportunities to correct these issues if 
3 that's not what she intended. If she didn't intend all the 
4 panels and all the sheds, she had an opportunity to correct 
5 them. She didn't sue to collect the two feeders. 
6 And, Your Honor, this might seem like a small thing, 
7 but this is fairly important. There was substantial evidence 
8 that showed that two of the feeders were actually on her 
9 property. She didn't dispute --
10 THE COURT: Did I miss -- as I am recalling, I 
11 thought she said the feeders were on her property. I 
12 understand they have a different view, but wasn't that her 
13 testimony? 
14 MR. STEVENSON: Yes, Your Honor. Why I say 
15 substantial evidence, and the weight, at least, this goes to 
16 the weight of the evidence, there was three parties that said 
17 this was clearly on her property. And she hasn't sued to try 
18 to get it back or claim that it's not theirs. 
19 THE COURT: Can't she also -- apart from that, is 
20 there anything inconsistent with putting it even in the same 
21 category as the horse walker? I mean, the horse walker, it 
22 was within the right-of-way, but it was the wiring was 
23 connected to the barn. And, therefore, made sense to leave 
24 that, especially, when she knew that he wanted it very badly. 
25 And she testified that between the time of their first visit 
and the return of Mr. Adair with the contract she had talked 
to her children about that, and they had decided just to let 
the horse walker go. So, what's inconsistent with saying I'm 
4 1 going to give you these things even though they are not 
5 within the property? Is there anything inconsistent with 
6| that? 
MR. STEVENSON: Well, first, Your Honor, my 
recollection of the facts on that point are different. I had 
9 I to pin her down after that, because she first said, no, we 
10 didn't talk about any of the individual items. And it was 
11 only when Mr. Adair came later that same day that they viewed 
12 it for the very first time she admitted that she saw that the 
13 horse walker was even listed. So, she didn't have the 
14 discussion with her children prior to seeing that. Maybe she 
15 had a discussion with them after she saw that the horse 
16 walker was listed. 
17 The only testimony that was had concerning what was 
18 discussed was two items. One, it appears that Miss Judy 
19 Flint said they discussed each item. And then, both Richard 
20 Flint and Joe Adair said, you know, both gave common 
21 statements that she said it all goes. And to the extent that 
22 there was a discussion about the horse walker individually, 
23 like Miss Judy discussed, if there was a discussion, there 
24 was a discussion about all of the items, not just -- not just 
25 them in general. So, her -- she did --
1 THE COURT: Did s h e s a y t h a t ? 
2 | MR. STEVENSON: W h a t ' s t h a t ? 
THE COURT: Did s h e s a y t h a t ? 
4I MR. STEVENSON: Did M i s s F l i n t s a y t h a t ? 
5 THE COURT: Yes. 
6 MR. STEVENSON: Yes, Miss Flint said they discussed 
7 J each item. So, in essence, Your Honor, if you look at it 
from our standpoint, the easiest thing for someone to say 
9 I that has decided they got a bad deal, that things didn't turn 
10 out the way they wanted them to, is to say, well, I never 
11 intended that. That wasn't part of the deal. 
12 Well, apparently, you know, Miss Stone's testimony 
13 was simply, we didn't discuss it beforehand. And 1 signed 
14 the REPC. I never intended to include any other personal 
15 property outside of my boundary. Well, she can't say that 
16 because, certainly, the feeders and the horse walker were 
17 within her newly defined boundary. Not only that, it was two 
18 months later that she finally even learned where the boundary 
19 was. So, it would be very difficult for her to say I didn't 
20 include these items when she didn't know where the boundary 
21 was. 
22 Now, the other issue, she didn't, I wanted to point out 
23 that Your Honor just mentioned, you mentioned that the 
24 electrical for the horse walker comes over to my client's 
25 property. Now, I'll admit, I'm not a farmer. And I don't know 
what the price of a new horse walker is and what it takes to 
put in all the cement work to even hold up one of these 
behemoths, but a horse walker is not a small item. If she 
4 I wanted to be able to maintain use of it, she very easily could 
5 have kept it. 
6 THE COURT: Could I interrupt you for just a minute? 
7 I MR. STEVENSON: Sure. Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead and finish your thought, then 
9 1 I'll go back. 
10 MR. STEVENSON: I was going to say, Your Honor, her 
11 stated intent as part of the hearing was that she wanted 
12 to -- she planned to go ahead and develop the back property 
13 and even to sell it and to develop it into, perhaps, lots. 
14 If she had to put a road through there, it's entirely 
15 consistent with the statement of Joe Adair and the statement 
16 of Judy Flint and the statement of Richard Flint that she 
17 intended for all of the personal property to go. She didn't 
18 want it. She got rid of her animals. She didn't intend to 
19 do that animal work anymore. She didn't need the panels. 
20 She didn't need the loafing sheds. 
21 Now, the first time that the issue even came up about 
22 the panels and whether the panels were theirs was well after 
23 this litigation began. The first time that the sheds even 
24 came up was well after the REPC and the Bill of Sale was 
25 signed. Testimony was it came up months later when she 
finally wanted to kick them off her land. Then, for the 
first time, she had these other thoughts, I don't want to 
have you -- you know. Those are mine and I am asserting a 
right to them. So, at that point, she was asserting a right 
under the contract saying, I never gave you that. That's the 
first time that my clients ever heard it. 
So, the real question for Your Honor is, was the 
personal property defined under the contract? We would say, 
yes, it was. But to the extent there is possibly more than one 
meaning, Your Honor. You need to find that it was ambiguous 
and allow the parole testimony that's already been added. 
Now, as far as the parole testimony, I want to point 
out the one thing that I think is clear. And this court -- I 
don't know that the other side can refute this. The one thing 
that is clear is that Miss Stone did not intend to just include 
the property within the survey. She never included that. She 
never intended that. It's clear from both the original REPC, 
the Bill of Sale, and the testimony from the other day, she 
didn't include just the -- she didn't intend just the items 
that were in the REPC and the Bill of Sale. I'm sorry. She 
didn't mean to -- she wasn't just including the items as 
defined by the survey. 
And there is two things that point to that. One, 
Your Honor, first, is the property boundary under the map 
that has a yellow line showed the original boundary and then 
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1 the modified boundary. The original boundary didn't even 
2 include the hay barn. And if what she intended was to just 
3 include certain items, she didn't know what she was going to 
4 include. The hay barn would have been excluded if you looked 
5 at the original 2 acres. If you look at -- if you looked at 
6 it the other way, the 66 acres, then all of a sudden it 
7 excludes three sheds and about 27 pieces of either fencing or 
8 panels that my clients claim were part of the deal that were 
9 mobile. 
10 So, the one thing that we can, we do know is that Miss 
11 Stone didn't intend to have just what's on their property per 
12 the survey. The horse walker and, especially, both horse 
13 walker and feeders are in the same category. They both prove 
14 that. 
15 THE COURT: I'm looking at my notes from Mrs. Stone's 
16 testimony. And you can correct me, but my notes say that all 
17 of the feeders were on the 2 acres at the time of the sale. 
18 Did she not testify about that? 
19 MR. STEVENSON: I know my clients testified that two 
20 of them were not, that they were on her property. One of 
21 them, Mr. Flint, specified that one was on the 66 foot 
22 right-of-way and one was out in their pasture. So -- and I 
23 guess what we could do, if that point needs to be clarified, 
24 we can certainly open up testimony again. I do believe that 
25 Miss Stone, I can't recall whether she refuted that or not. 
1 My recollection is that if she addressed it, it was very, 
2 very briefly. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. STEVENSON: Your Honor, I guess one other thing I 
5 wanted to point out is Your Honor pointed us to another case 
6 called Tangren Family Trust vs. Tangren. And, in that case, 
7 parole evidence was precluded because the one party was 
seeking to have it admitted to show that the parties did not 
9 | intend to have a valid contract and, secondly, to show that 
10 the contract itself was subject to a condition precedent. In 
11 J this case, there is -- we don't have that similar 
circumstance. But what we do have is there is an absence of 
13I a condition precedent. If Miss Stone intended to say I only 
14 want to include in the Bill of Sale the items that are within 
15 the surveyed lines, Your Honor, she could have put that in 
16 there, been very easy for her to do it. 
17 THE COURT: How do you get around in this case the 
18 merger clause that's in the contract? In other words, even 
19 assuming, looking at the evidence in a light most favorable 
20 to your client, that contract was presented later in the day 
21 after all these conversations had occurred in terms of what 
22 goes with the property or what stays and all of those things? 
23 And so, if you look at the purpose of the merger clause, 
24 everything that is in terms of parole evidence is excluded 
25 and you look at just the contract. Isn't that a proper way 
r>> -1 *~J 
of looking at it? 
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, Your Honor, if there is no 
ambiguity in the documents. Your Honor, you cited to us the 
Danes vs. Vincent case the other day and also the Tangren 
case. And the Earnshaw case actually cited to Danes and, I 
think, clarified that it's the same exact standard, whether 
the issue is the merger clause or, in our case, it's just a 
facial ambiguity. In fact, on page 4 of the Earnshaw case it 
said, said the sole issue on appeal -- well, I can get just 
right to the issue. It refers to Danes. And it says, "Once 
the court determines that the term or provision is facially 
ambiguous, it may determine the parties' intent through 
examination of parole evidence, the determination of which 
presents a question of fact." 
THE COURT: Let me stop you right there, though. 
Looking just at the contract itself, without bringing in, you 
know, the conversations that occurred upstairs in Mrs. 
Stone's bedroom, and just looking at the contract, what about 
the contract that is ambiguous? What is it that's ambiguous? 
MR. STEVENSON: Your Honor, the statement "all." 
It's either three or six panels. 
THE COURT: But isn't it — yeah, three or six. But 
how many are on the property that's being sold? 
MR. STEVENSON: Well, at the time — 
THE COURT: Are there just three? 
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MR. STEVENSON: What's that? 
THE COURT; Aren't there just three sheds on the 
property that's being sold? 
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, Your Honor. There is only three 
that are on the physical property. 
THE COURT: So, where is the ambiguity in the 
contract then? 
MR. STEVENSON: The ambiguity is found in several 
items. One, when this contract was made, it says to 
specify — it says that there is going to be a survey that 
occurs. It first says here's the items that are included. 
It says "all." Then it says there is going to be a survey. 
All right? Not only that, but then you have a final Bill of 
Sale that includes every item in the formal REPC, but the 
Bill of Sale does not mention the hay barn. It doesn't 
mention the other animal barn. I think --
THE COURT: That's not in dispute though, is it? 
MR. STEVENSON: It's not in dispute, but it certainly 
shows there is ambiguity between the Bill of Sale. And there 
is ambiguity between the REPC addendum, the REPC itself and 
then the final Bill of Sale. The final Bill of Sale says 
"all panels, all gates." And if "all" is supposed to be 
interpreted from the four corners, you look at the -- you 
look at the four corners to determine the intent of the 
parties. In this case, the intent can be seen from the fact 
that the feeders and the horse walker are included, which are 
not part of that surveyed property in the final Bill of Sale. 
So, Your Honor, you can look at that and determine that, 
4 I sure, they intended "all" to mean all six and not just three. 
5 But, Your Honor, I think -- I think it's clear from the 
6 evidence that's come up there is no doubt about it that there 
7 is some ambiguity. If it had been clear, it would have said 
8 six sheds, 30 panels instead of the three they got. Or it 
9 would have been that clear. 
10 THE COURT: Let me ask, point you to the Bill of 
11 Sale. It says that, "The seller assigns and transfers unto 
12 the buyer that certain personal property now at 6006 South 
13 7100 West more particularly described." But wouldn't you say 
14 that language there was the personal property now at this 
15 address? 1 mean, this is the Bill of Sale's being executed 
16 contemporaneously with the conveyance of the real property 
17 which has now been surveyed. I mean, there is no ambiguity 
18 about the 2 acres of where it is. 
19 MR. STEVENSON: Your Honor — 
20 THE COURT: So, we are talking about now, this is in 
21 April, long after the parties have contracted, the survey has 
22 occurred. Your clients have gone out and looked at the four 
23 stakes. They know where that property is. They are 
24 satisfied with the survey and the staking of the four corners 
25 of the property. They know where that property is. And now 
1 it's talking about the property they are buying. And it says 
2 that certain property now at this address. 
3 MR. STEVENSON: Your Honor — 
4 THE COURT: Are your sheds A, B and C now at this 
5 2 acres at 6006? 
6 MR. STEVENSON: No, Your Honor. The same language 
7 I minus the word "now" exists in the REPC. And there's already 
8 been testimony, Your Honor, that there was no change that was 
9 done by Miss Stone or by her agent to that final Bill of 
10 Sale. It's simply reflected what the real estate purchase 
11 contract had. But, more importantly, Your Honor, the most 
12 important issue, if it says -- and I agree with you, I 
13 understand your point -- but, Your Honor, it includes the 
14 horse walker and feeders that weren't on her — weren't on 
15 their property. 
16 THE COURT: But she could give them anything she 
17 wanted, couldn't she? 
18 MR. STEVENSON: Including the three sheds, Your 
19 Honor. They certainly could have given the sheds --
20 THE COURT: Does it say six sheds? 
21 MR. STEVENSON: It just says "all." That's why there 
22 is ambiguity, Your Honor. That's why we need the parole 
23 evidence to show what the parties intended. And if 
24 instead -- if, instead, the opposing party were arguing -- if 
25 she says, well, it's just a mutual mistake, well, it would 
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have to be a reasonable mistake. And, in this case, I don't 
think we have that. I mean, we have three individuals who 
have testified. And the weight of the evidence shows that 
she intended for all of it to go. 
I guess, Your Honor, we would ask that you find that 
there is ambiguity in this Bill of Sale and in this REPC to the 
extent that "all" is not defined and opposing party is 
challenging 
"all" means 
give up all 
request tha 
case their 
conversion 
Thank you. 
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trial took 
it. We do believe that 
all six. And that she 
this personal property. 
Your Honor could find that 
intended -- she intended to 
And for these reasons, we 
t Your Honor grant the counter-plaintiffs in this 
relief that they have re 
and breach of contract. 
COURT: Thank you, Mr. 
NEELEY: Your Honor, on 
quested, stating both 1 
And put that to Your Honor. 
Stevenson, very much. 
behalf of Marlene Stone, 
e the court's patience in this matter. And the 
longer than we anticipated last week. 
Your Honor, our position in 
am relying 
that the Bi 
as it is a 
disposition 
Bill of Sal 
the final e 
to a large extent on the 
11 of Sale in this case 
final expression of the 
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e dated April 16, 2008, 
the matter is the, and I 
Danes/Vincent case, is 
is an integrated agreement 
parties' agreement to 
rty. So, we believe the 
the date of closing, is 
xpression of these parties' agreement and is, has 
been referred to in cases as an integrated agreement. 
The warranty deed, we believe, is an integrated 
document and is the final expression of the parties' 
conveyance of the real property, the 2 acres. The Uniform 
Real Estate Contract talks about 2 acres, but it does not 
specify the legal description. The deed and the Bill of 
Sale, Your Honor, I think, merge this real estate purchase 
contract into these two final documents commonly referred to 
in cases now as integrated agreements or integrated 
documents: The warranty deed as it relates to the real 
property, the Bill of Sale as it relates to the personal 
property. 
The Bill of Sale relating to the loafing sheds, to the 
horse walker and to the panels, Your Honor, is clear. It is 
not ambiguous. There is no facial ambiguity. There is no 
ambiguity as to the intent of the parties. The Bill of Sale 
dated April 16 states that Marlene Stone, as seller, is 
conveying and selling to Richard and Judy Flint, the buyers, 
that certain personal property now at 6006 South 7100 West in 
Hooper, Weber County, state of Utah, particularly described as 
follows. Oven, range, refrigerator, window covering, two wate] 
irrigation shares, all lounging, loafing sheds, panels, gates, 
feeders, waterers and horse walker as presently exist.1' 
The key language here, Your Honor, to my way of 
thinking, is that certain personal property now at that 
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address. It is clear she intended to sell the horse walker. 
It's in the Bill of Sale. It is clear that she intended to 
3 I sell the lounging and loafing sheds and panels now at that 
4 property. That property is described in the Bill of Sale as 
5 that property located at the 6006 South 7100 West. 
6 I Mrs. Stone testified last week that her address is 
5996 South 7100 West. The personal property located on her 
property was never intended tc be sold. The Bill of Sale is 
the final document. The horse walker is listed in here. 
10 I Factually, the horse walker, as I recall the testimony, was 
11 it somewhat straddles the property line. When the horses 
12 walk around there, they not only walk on Mrs. Stone's 
13 property, they will also walk on the Flints' property. So, 
14 something, obviously, had to be done with the horse walker. 
15 So, in this case, Mrs. Stone indicated and had in the 
16 Bill of Sale of the property that she's conveying to the 
17 Stones that it's on their property. That that is straddling 
18 her property, were theirs. And that is the horse walker. 
19 All of the panels, all of the gates, all of the sheds, all of 
20 the waterers, feeders, that type of thing, all of that 
21 personal property on her 15 acres stay with her. All of the 
22 personal property on the other 2 acres was conveyed by this 
23 Bill of Sale and by the warranty deed that the parties have 
24 signed. 
25 I don't know that there is a great deal of difference 
in referring to the documents as integrated documents or that 
the real estate purchase contract merged into the Bill of Sale 
and as to the warranty deed. The real estate purchase 
contract, Your Honor, consisted of four or five addendums. It 
is obvious that that needs to be consolidated into one 
document. And that was the final Bill of Sale executed on 
April the 16 of 2008. 
The real estate purchase contract also references that 
items of personal property are going to be sold and conveyed 
under a separate Bill of Sale. So, this real estate purchase 
contract continue --
THE COURT: Where are you reading from? 
MR. NEELEY: 1.1 of the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract. 
THE COURT: Okay. Yeah. 
MR. NEELEY: Right above the handwritten language of 
that. 
THE COURT: Yeah, I see it. 
MR. NEELEY: "Ovens, ranges, refrigerator, window 
coverings as presently exist. The following items shall be 
included in this sale and conveyed under separate bill of 
sales with warranties as to title. Then, after that, Your 
Honor, we have the addendums that talk about the loafing 
sheds and panels and gates and feeders and so forth. So, 
it's clear, Your Honor, that the real estate purchase 
??s 
1 contract contemplated a final Bill of Sale. We have a final 
2 Bill of Sale. Document refers to sheds and gates on that 
3 2 acres. And it clearly conveys the horse walker as well. 
4 The only other point, Your Honor, that we would make 
5 is that under paragraph 17 of the confidential general 
6 release and settlement agreement, the parties could ask for 
7 attorney fees in this case. I have prepared an affidavit. 
8 We have expended 12 hours in this case. 1 got in late in 
9 this case. I have expended 12 hours. I typically charge 
10 $200 per hour. And Mrs. Stone's attorney fees are $2,400 in 
11 this case plus costs. And I believe it's an appropriate case 
12 to award attorney fees in this matter, Your Honor. Thank 
13 you. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Stevenson, you may 
15 respond. 
16 MR. STEVENSON: I'm sure Your Honor must be tired of 
17 hearing the same issues. 
18 THE COURT: That's okay. I want to make sure I 
19 understand everything the way I should. That's why I'm 
20 asking questions. That's why I'm giving you every 
21 opportunity as well as Mr. Neeley that same opportunity. 
22 MR. STEVENSON: Great. Thank you, Your Honor. 
23 Mr. Neeley said this is integrated, it's an integrated 
24 matter in which the REPC, the addendums, and the Bill of Sale 
25 are all integrated to a final document, deed of trust, and said 
that merger is applicable in this case. 
Now, Your Honor, under the case I referred to 
earlier, which is Spears vs. "Warr, said that merger is not 
applicable where there is ambiguity in the final documents or 
where there is the existence of rights which are collateral. 
In this case, Your Honor, I would assert that there are two 
issues which are ambiguous in the final Bill of Sale. First, 
is the word "all." There is no question it says all. What 
does all mean? Is it all encompassing? In this case, it can 
either mean three or six sheds. It can mean three or 30 
panels, gates and other temporary gates -- and other 
temporary gates. The question becomes -- or, I guess, the 
second issue, Your Honor, that is ambiguous, first, is the 
word "all. " 
The second thing is under the final Bill of Sale, it 
says, "that certain personal property now at 6006 South 7100 
West in Hooper, Utah." That certain property now. If we 
look at that, that means the court can either interpret that 
as meaning it's all the property that's as currently defined 
at that residence and for you the final closing documents. 
If that's the case, the horse walker and at least two feeders 
are not going to be included. There is also some dispute 
about there was at least one panel or gate that was between 
the two properties. So, that certain personal property is 
certainly ambiguous with regard to those items that are not 
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1 on that certain property. They certainly aren't now part of 
2 that property. 
3 So, the question is, if Marlene Stone intended I'm 
4 going to sell just this item, just the horse walker and none 
5 other, then her testimony would have been we had a bargain 
6 for exchange on that item. That was not the case. What was 
7 the case in the original REPC was the word "all." And it 
8 intended to include all the matters. You know, her original 
9 statement was, ,fit all goes." The way the evidence shows 
10 that these items were discussed, and she said it all goes. 
11 And so, Your Honor, we would ask you to find that there is 
12 ambiguity in the final documents under the standards set 
13 forth in Spears vs. V\?arr and as further defined by Flores vs. 
14 Earnshaw. 
15 And, finally, Your Honor, we also pointed out in our 
16 direct that Section 17 of the REPC allows for attorney's 
17 fees. If Your Honor would like, depending on the ruling, I 
18 would, of course, put together an application for that at the 
19 time of costs within five days of the ruling. My fees are 
20 150 an hour, Your Honor. Still haven't figured out how many 
21 hours we put in to date, but we'll do that with our costs 
22 breakdown if Your Honor goes in case for the defendants and 
23 counter-plaintiffs. 
24 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. 
25 MR. STEVENSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
1 THE COURT: Let me tell you folks what I have done. 
2 I have -- I started outlining just some major points that I 
3 wanted to give to you, because I anticipated that I would, 
4 after hearing argument, render a decision from the bench. 
5 The more I began working it through the intricate factual 
6 aspects of this, and then later trying to relate it to the 
7 case law that I believe is controlling in this case, it 
8 became clear to me that I would do a disservice to you as 
9 well as to the court if I tried to do this orally. And that, 
10 I think -- so earlier today I began writing my decision. And 
11 it's mostly written. I don't know that I'll finish it today. 
12 But I will finish it tomorrow. And you'll have my decision 
13 in the mail tomorrow on this case. Okay? 
14 MR. STEVENSON: Okay. 
15 THE COURT: But 1 think it will be better if it's 
16 written out so that you can thoughtfully read it and 
17 understand my analysis of the case. All right. Well, thank 
18 you very much, folks 
19 MR. STEVENSON: Thank you, Your Honor, 
20 J MR. NEELEY: Thank you, 
21 
22 
Q Or arms that go around in a circle. And you exercise 
the horse that way? 
A Yes. 
Q Would it be fair to say that the horse being 
exercised by this horse walker be partly on Marlene's 
property and partly on yours? 
A It would have been where it was, correct. 
MR. NEELEY: That's all. 
MR. STEVENSON: Your Honor, I believe while he's 
still there, I neglected to add that to the record, would 
like to offer the settlement agreement as part of the record 
in this case. 
THE COURT: That's received. 
MR. NEELEY: I think it's already in the file, judge. 
And I have no objection to it. 
THE COURT: Okay. It's received as an exhibit in 
this trial. Thank you. 
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 7 
was received into evidence.) 
MR. STEVENSON: All right. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. You may step 
down. 
Call your next witness, please. 
MR. STEVENSON: Next witness will be Jeff Harris. 
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1 A I think we saw it on the computer or something. We 
2 drove by. And it had flyers in the front yard. We picked up 
3 a flyer, then we set up an appointment to go look at it. 
4 Q All right. At any point, did you meet with the 
5 plaintiff in this action, Marlene Stone? 
6| A Yes. 
Q Okay. Did you -- did you meet with her on one of the 
meetings in which you were going to look at the home? 
9 I A What's that? 
10 Q Did you meet with Marlene Stone when you looked at 
11 the home? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q And what was the size of the property that you were 
14 considering buying? 
15 A We were looking at the 2 acres. 
16 Q Okay. And, in your discussions with Miss Stone about 
17 what personal property was included in the 2 acres that you 
18 were potentially buying, what did she state was the personal 
19 property that was included with that purchase? 
20 MR. NEELEY: Your Honor, I'm going to object on the 
21 grounds of hearsay unless he has some type of Real Estate 
22 Purchase Contract or something in writing. And I think it's 
23 being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. I think 
24 it's clearly hearsay. And I would object to that. 
25 MR. STEVENSON: Your Honor, this is a party 
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opponent -- I mean, admission. This is a party to this 
litigation. Not only does it establish her own statements --
THE COURT: But they are statements, even assuming 
they were true, they were statements made to him. They were 
not statements made surrounding this transaction, correct? 
MR. STEVENSON: They were -- he hasn't testified that 
it has to do with this transaction. 
THE COURT: Then what would be the relevance? 
MR. STEVENSON: Well, it's material, goes to the 
plaintiff's state of mind. 
THE COURT: Not necessarily. The best you could 
argue, counsel, would be her state of mind as he may be -- as 
she may have been negotiating with Mr. Harrison. But it 
doesn't necessarily state what her state of mind was when she 
dealt with the defendants in this case. And that's what's at 
issue before this court. 
MR. STEVENSON: Well, then, Your Honor, I think it 
would also show a plan, scheme that showed what her intent 
and plan was concerning this property, and would probably 
show what her, certainly what her intent and plan was 
concerning the property, her motive. 
THE COURT: Let me just ask. We know that there was 
a multiple listing and that there were three options. One 
was for the sale of the whole 17 acres. Another option was 
to sell 2 acres, another option to sell 1 acre. And he's 
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testified. I assume he can testify about that because he saw 
the multiple listing on the computer just as anybody else was 
interested in the property. But, beyond that, what can he 
say that would be, that would be a fact in this case? 
MR. STEVENSON: Well, Your Honor, I believe he's 
already testified that it was the 2 acres that he was looking 
at. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. STEVENSON: So, that's — I think that's already 
been established. The question is whether or not he has 
information that would be relevant to what her plan was for 
the sale and whether she had, you know, what her motive was 
in selling the entire property, what she stated to him it 
was. When I say selling the personal property, whether she 
was selling all of that. It certainly goes to --
THE COURT: Well, it's clearly hearsay. So, point to 
me an exception that would allow it to come in. 
MR. STEVENSON: Well, I think as I mentioned before, 
I think it would go --
THE COURT: Give me a rule, counsel. 
MR. STEVENSON: Under Section 803, Your Honor, for 
one thing, I think it would go towards --
THE COURT: 8 03. 
MR. STEVENSON: 803-3 would go t owards t h e e x i s t i n g 
m e n t a l , e m o t i o n a l or p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n . I t h i n k t h a t would 
i ?R 
go towards the, you know, the state of mind of him of 
knowing, knowing what the property was that was being offered 
as part of it. It would, go towards her plan in terms of what 
she intended on the MLS listing to sell. 
THE COURT: Well, first of all, let's go to Rule 803. 
Okay. Now, what subpart? 
MR. STEVENSON: Well, I would say, first, under 
number three and also under 801(d)(2), but we'll get to that 
one. Under 803-3, a statement of the declarant's then 
existing state of mind can certainly be an exception to the 
rule. The question here is whether declarant's state of mind 
was to include all of this personal property or not. And 
that's certainly at issue in this case. 
MR. NEELEY: And, Your Honor, my response is if there 
was a conversation to that effect it was with this gentleman 
on a different day, different time, and it's not material or 
relevant to the Flints' case. 
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the objection on 
that basis. I mean, people can make different offers to 
different people. But it doesn't mean that on one day 
because she makes an offer to him that it's the same offer 
that she made to him. In fact, isn't it the best evidence as 
to what Mr. Flint -- he's already testified of what her 
agreement was with him. So, are you -- you are trying to 
have this gentleman testify about what she may have said to 
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him and have it contradict what Mr. Flint said? 
MR. STEVENSON: Well, what -- I'm not trying to make 
contradict at all what Mr. Flint says. 
THE COURT: But hasn't Mr. Flint testified, counsel? 
MR. STEVENSON: He has, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And what did he say? 
MR. STEVENSON: Well, he's already stated that all of 
the personal property was included. 
THE COURT: Well, counsel, that's not what his 
testimony was. The testimony that I recall, and you can 
correct me, the testimony that I heard was when he came out 
there, and counsel, you asked the question -- or, no, Mr. 
Neeley asked the question -- that she wanted to sell all of 
the 17 acres and all the property because she didn't want to 
have the responsibility of managing any of it further. Is 
that a fair statement? 
MR. STEVENSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then Mr. Neeley asked the 
question, did you have any conversation with her on or about 
February 1st regarding any of the sheds on the 66 foot 
right-of-way? He said, no, he didn't recall any conversation 
about any of the sheds on the 66 foot right-of-way. His 
testimony is he assumed that it went because she had made a 
general statement in relation to the 17 acres that she wished 
to get rid of all of the sheds. Is that a fair statement? 
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MR. STEVENSON: I think, Your Honor, I'm not real 
sure about the timing in terms of when he found out about the 
60 acres. I don't know if that was even at issue. I don't 
think they even knew which 60 acres she might be considering 
at that time. But I won't go back and --
THE COURT: Well, I marked it at 3:05 when he gave 
that testimony. The testimony was, and Mr. Neeley asked her, 
and this was the latter part of February, they had a 
conversation out in the horse barn. And Mr. Neeleyfs 
question was, did you recall, have any discussion about the 
sheds on the 66 foot right-of-way? And he said he doesn't 
recall any discussion about the sheds on the 66 foot 
right-of-way. He just assumed that those sheds went with the 
property because she had talked about selling all of the 
17 acres and getting rid of the sheds because she couldn't 
manage the property anymore. That was his testimony. 
And I guess -- and I just think it's kind of a 
stretch to bring in what somebody else, his conversations 
with her on another day and have it somehow be binding in 
another contract with another party. I'm straining to see 
the relevance of that. I mean, I understand what you are 
trying to accomplish, but you would be asking -- even if he 
said something that you want him to say, would that 
contradict what your own client has testified in this case 
about? 
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MR. STEVENSON: No, Your Honor. I think my client 
and Mr. Adair have both testified that the parties resolved 
that the property would be purchased was 2 acres. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. STEVENSON: Okay? And then the discussion that's 
already been testified to about what was included, there was 
the generalized statement that you have already referenced 
to. And if that is indeed the case, trying to establish 
whether that was her plan, her scheme, her intent, is that 
what she intended to sell? This gentleman knows what she 
told him about the same 2 acres and what personal property 
was included to the extent he can provide value to the court 
in saying what one of the parties has stated, I think that 
would help the court. 
THE COURT: Anything else you wanted to say, counsel, 
or Mr. Neeley before — 
MR. STEVENSON: Yes. I guess the other thing under 
Rule 807, statements that are offered as evidence of a 
material fact, I would say also that this is material fact at 
question here, is whether or not the property, the personal 
property that .the plaintiff disputes, that is a material fact 
in this case. That under Rule 807 and also under, I guess --
again, I would say this is a party opponent admission. I 
know that under 801(d) (2), it should be an admission by a 
party opponent the state has offered against the party. And 
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the parties' own statements, in. either individual or 
representative capacity, it seems I'm not sure why Your Honor 
would exclude it as a party opponent admission either. I'm 
certainly, I can call him on cross to -- or on rebuttal -- to 
show that she had stated something different than what she 
had said. And that is her impeachment. 
THE COURT: Is this something different about her 
transaction with Mr. Flint or is it just a statement that she 
made to a third person relative to a prospective contract? 
MR. STEVENSON: It would just show the consistency 
for the 2 acres that was offered. She was also offering the 
personal property that my client's claim was offered. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Neeley? 
MR. NEELEY: Your Honor, they are entirely two 
different dates, two different situations, two different 
parties. I don't see the connection between the two. But if 
she ever said anything to him, it would not be relevant to 
the case at hand where we have his testimony and his written 
contract. That's what is important in the case. There is no 
causal connection between these two parties. 
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain that, the objection. 
It's -- I understand, and I respect what you are trying to 
accomplish, but we have two different dates, we have two 
different prospective buyers. And the person could make an 
offer to one person and days later even reconsider. See, I 
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don't know that I want to do that. And just because she 
makes an offer, even assuming the best scenario for your 
client, best evidence, that he made -- she made an offer to 
him, and then days later made a different offer to your 
client, doesn't necessarily mean that the offer she made to 
him is the same one she made him. People change their minds. 
And I just don't think it's relevant. 
I think what this court has to do in fairness to both 
parties say, what did these parties discuss, and then what 
did they finally agree in writing, and not what conversations 
may have occurred on another date with other people. I mean, 
if in fact your approach was that the plaintiff in this case 
told this gentleman, you know, I told Mr. Flint this, then 
that would be an admission against interest. If she said 
something that she's now denying in this trial, and Mr. Flint 
is contending that it occurred, and she told him, then it 
would be very relevant, because it would be an admission 
against interest. 
But the fact that she makes a different offer to a 
different person on a different day can't be controlling in 
this case. Just can't. So, I'm going to sustain that 
objection. 
MR. STEVENSON: All right. Thank you, Your Honor. 
You can step down. And you and your wife are free to 
go. 
1 A 1 
1 Q Okay. In your experience, what was the condii 
2 these loafing sheds? 
3 A They were in fair condition. 
4 Q Okay. Are they movable? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Now, how about the panels and gates? Are they -- in 
7 I your experience, have you sold these as part of some of your 
real estate sales? 
9 1 A I have. 
10 Q Okay. What's the value of these new? 
11 A New, depending on the brand, they range from a 
12 hundred to $150 apiece for like a 12 foot, 14 foot panel. 
13 Q What have you sold used panels for? 
14 A $50 up to 65. 
15 Q Okay. Would you turn back to the real estate --
16 well, let's turn back to the Bill of Sale. I'm sorry. It 
17 says on here, ".all lounging and loafing sheds, panels, gates, 
18 feeders, waterers and horse walker as presently exist." Was 
19 the horse walker on Miss Stone's property after the 
20 boundaries were changed? 
21 A Yes, it was. 
22 Q • So, it wasn't on the Flints' property at all? 
23 A Never. 
24 Q To your knowledge, were some of the feeders, one or 
25 more of the feeders on Miss Stone's property? 
A Yes. 
Q Were there any other items that were actually on Miss 
Stone's property at the time that the Flints purchased the 
2 acres? 
A I'm sure there was some panels and gates. 
Q Okay. In your mind, from the language of the Bill of 
Sale and the REPC, were the Flints entitled to immediate 
possession of those, that property, of the -- let me specify 
which property I'm talking about -- of the sheds which are 
shown as A, B, and C on the map? Let me ask you first that 
question. Were they entitled to immediate possession based 
on the REPC and the Bill of Sale for the sheds at A, B and C? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. What about the panels, any of the movable 
panels that were on Miss Flints -- on Miss Stone's property? 
A Yes. They were all present. 
Q Okay. Do you have any, any experience, either in 
selling real estate or personally, in which you had to 
install any of these sheds, where you had to install them? 
A I haven't had to install them, no. 
MR. STEVENSON: Okay. No further questions for this 
witness. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
1 the winter, it was a good situation to work out, because now 
2 we had loafing sheds for the horses, a hay barn with stalls, 
3 and now a pasture to turn them out in and, also, two other 
4 properties that we could make hay for them in the winter. 
5 Q Okay. And let me ask you about the discussion that 
6 you had when you talked about what items were on her property 
7 were going to be included in the sale. Tell me about that 
8 discussion. And, first, tell me approximately when did it 
9 happen, to the best of your recollection. 
10 A First part of February. And we had driven by and 
11 seen it, me and Judy. And then we called -- we had an 
12 appointment to meet with her, I think, around 1 ofclock or 
13 two, or something like that in the afternoon. Me and Judy 
14 had drove down by it and seen it. And so, we thought, well, 
15 now that we are already here maybe we can just see if we 
16 could look at it now. And so, we called Joe. And Joe called 
17 Marlene. And she says, no, you'll have to come at the time 
18 that you have already scheduled. So, then me and Judy just 
19 drove around and went back up and talked to Joe for a while 
20 until the time came. And then we came back to that 
21 appointment time and met with Marlene. 
22 And she took us through the house and showed us all 
23 the house and upstairs, ail the room. Then from her bedroom, 
24 master bedroom you can look out the window and see the whole 
25 property and the pastures and everything. And that's when we 
1 started talking about the 2 acres or the whole acres, or 1 
2 acre or the whole thing. And 1 says, if I had the money I 
3 would like it all. But until I win the lottery I'll have to 
4 settle for what I can afford. So, she mentioned the 1 acre 
5 with some of the items or 2 acres with everything. And we 
6 says, well, we would like to get the 2 acres. And then it 
7 was after that that she mentioned about the road and that she 
8 would have to put in a 60 foot right-of-way. At the time I 
9 looked at it I was thinking that the whole 2 acres was 
10 actually covering everything, you know. And so, when she 
11 says about taking out the 60 feet, I wasn't sure at first 
12 what side she was talking about. But then I thought, well, 
13 if she took it off the other side that would do away with the 
14 driveway and that. That wouldn't work. But I didn't really 
15 picture where it was going to be until they come out and 
16 surveyed and pounded the stakes in. Then that, of course, 
17 presented a different illusion in my mind as to what 
18 everything was. 
19 But we did talk about like Joe mentioned. She -- she 
20 had lost her husband. They had been quite tied up with the 
21 horse business that they- had had and hadn't really had time 
22 to get away and do anything as far as vacations and things. 
23 And she says that she just wanted to get rid of everything. 
24 She was going to move. And she had sold her tractor, or 
25 going to. And she had already sold her baler and swather and 
1 a few things. And we ended up buying a harrow from her and a 
2 spring tooth that we bought off of her. 
3 Q Okay. 
4 A And she told us that everything that was there was 
5 there. There's a little trailer that goes with a, like a 
6 lawnmower, riding lawnmower or four-wheeler that was left out 
7 there on the side property out by the front of the road 
8 that's still sitting there. She says that come with it. 
9 There is the troughs. There were several troughs, several 
10 feeders. And she just says everything went. She said, I 
11 don't want anything. In fact, everything that was in the 
12 barn. She says, I don't care about the feeders. There was 
13 an electric water heater and a calf delivery for pulling a 
14 calf out of a cow that was in there that later come up 
15 missing. And I had mentioned that to her. But where they 
16 went, we didn't know. 
17 A time or two we had driven down the far road to the 
18 north. And we could see the barn door was open. And when we 
19 had been there to look at it, it was always closed. So, I 
20 don't know if someone else was there or what,. But everything 
21 else was left there. There was even a garbage can full of 
22 stuff that had old halters and different things in that's 
23 still sitting there now. And nobody took anything other than 
24 those two items that disappeared. 
25 Q Let me ask you: Looking back at this Addendum 1, we 
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A That's on her property. Then there is 11 more 
galvanized panels that existed here on where item "C" is 
right there. That loafing shed there, there was a corral 
there with those gates. And then over here by the where the 
horse walker was, there is some panel there. And I counted 
to the best that I could see around 11 more panels. And then 
there is two gates, walk-through gates that are included in 
those panels. 
Q Okay. Now, let me have you turn to what's been shown 
as the, I guess, Defendant's Exhibit No. 3, which is the Bill 
of Sale. Should be to your left on the top of the -- just 
further to your left there. 
A Oh, right here? Okay. 
Q I think it's under the picture you just put there. 
A Oh. 
Q Here, it is. Yeah. 
A Okay. 
Q Okay. Under the Bill of Sale, the bottom of the 
first paragraph, these are the items that were included in 
the Bill of Sale. And I want you to go through and tell me 
if any of these, which ones are disputed. All right. Oven, 
range. Is there any dispute as far as you know concerning 
the oven and range? 
A No. 
Q All right. Refrigerator? 
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A No. 
Q Window covering? 
A Urn, no. 
Q All right. Two water irrigation shares? 
A No. 
Q We have talked about the loafing sheds -- lounge and 
loafing sheds. There is, I think you said, that there is --
now let me ask you this: Which loafing sheds are in dispute 
and when did they first become in dispute? 
A A, B, and C is what is the issue on the loafing sheds 
right now. 
Q All right. Now, tell me to your best knowledge, when 
did that first become in dispute? When did those loafing 
sheds first come into dispute? 
A After she revoked the lease on the 15 acres, then she 
says I'm taking everything back. So, she took the pastures 
back. We had to have our horses off the property by the 1st 
of January. And then, at that point, she started talking 
"this is my side and this is your side.11 And I said 
something about the panels. 
•And she says, No. Them are not your panels. 
I says, They certainly are. I says, We agreed to all 
of that. 
And she says, Why would you think they would be yours 
if they are on my ground? 
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And I said, Well, when we talked about it, it wasn't 
2 I necessarily on your ground because at that time it hadn't 
3 been surveyed. 
4 Q Okay. And did you have any other discussions about 
5 anything else that was on her ground or your ground? 
6 I A No. She told me that she didn't care about the horse 
walker. That if I wanted it I could have that. But I had to 
have that off by the 1st of February. 
Q All right. Let me keep having you take a look at the 
10I Bill of Sale some more. It says -- we talked about the 
11 panels and the gates. How many gates are in dispute, and are 
12 they in dispute? 
13 A Well, there would be four, going up the north side, 
14 then two over by this shed, the wooden shed, item "E" on that 
15 fence line. East fence line, there is two gates there. 
16 Q Okay. And are those mobile gates? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q Okay. So, you could use those to corral your 
19 animals? 
20 A I could, yeah. 
21 Q Now, feeders. Were there any disputes about any 
22 feeders? 
23 A Not to my knowledge. 
24 Q Okay. When you purchased the property, or let's say 
25 at the time of the Bill of Sale, when you obtained possession 
of th e property, were some of the feeders on her side of the 
property? 
A 
Q 
her ' s 
A 
Q 
There was a couple of metal ones. 
Okay. And did she dispute whether those feeders were 
? 1 
Um-hmm. 
Okay. Has there been a lawsuit concerning the 
possession of those feeders? I 
A 
Q 
on an 
A 
Q 
horse 
A 
have 
Q 
sort 
A 
Q 
A 
No. 
All right. Next, the waterers. Is there any dispute 
y of the waterers? 
Not that I know of. 
Okay. The horse walker. Is there a dispute on the 
walker? 
Not any longer. Like I say, she told me that I could 
that. And I says, Well, I thought it was mine anyway. 
But she says, I want it off my property. 
Okay. And so, the horse walker, she didn't bring any 
of suit to claim that that was her's, correct? 
No. 
All right. She didn't dispute the horse walker? 
Other than I had to have it moved by the 1st of 
February. 
Q Okay. So, under this Bill of Sale, it says all 
loafing -- all lounging and loafing sheds. So, let me just 
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make sure I clarify for the court what the dispute in your 
understanding is, is that for the loafing sheds there is 
3 1 three sheds in dispute, which are A, B, and C, correct? 
4| A (No audible answer.) 
Q There are panels which I believe you said that there 
is four 16 foot panels and eleven 10 foot panels in dispute? 
A Right. That are galvanized. 
Q Those are the mobile panels? 
A Yes. 
10I Q Then you said there was some -- two gates? 
11 A Four. 
12 Q Four mobile gates? 
13 A Yeah. 
14 Q Okay. And the feeders that were on her property and 
15 the horse walker, those haven't been in dispute? 
16 A No. 
17 Q Okay. Let me ask you to look at the picture. There 
18 is the two pictures that you identified which are labeled as 
19 Defendant's Exhibit 3, which is --
20 A This one? 
21 Q Yeah, that. Are the pictures of the panels -- I know 
22 the court, I believe they asked you if those are the panels. 
23 Are these the 4 foot -- I mean, the 16 foot panels or the 10 
24 foot panels? 
25 A Them are the 16. 
Q Okay. Are the 10 foot panels similar in nature to 
those? 
A Yes. Only just smaller. Then there is clamps that 
you can clamp them together. You put two clamps on each 
section, so you got two up and two bottom that you put them 
together. Then you put a bolt through the middle. And 
that's what holds them together. 
MR. STEVENSON: Okay. Your Honor, I would like to 
move to have Exhibit 3, Defendant's Exhibit 3 moved into 
evidence. 
MR. NEELEY: I have no objection. 
THE COURT: It's received. 
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 3 
was received into evidence.) 
MR. STEVENSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
BY MR. STEVENSON: 
Q Now, you testified that Miss Stone now claimed that 
the sheds were her's. And, approximately the time period, 
let me ask you, were these --
THE COURT: Let me ask you. That isn't clear in my 
mind. You mentioned January. Is this January of '08? Or 
did I misunderstand you? When did you find out that the --
THE WITNESS: Yeah. It was January of -- no, of '09 
when we had to have the horses off the property. 
THE COURT: Well, that makes sense to me. This 
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THE COURT: Are you talking about the gates now? 
MR. STEVENSON: These are the gates, yeah. I'm 
sorry. That's confusing. 
BY MR. STEVENSON: 
Q Let me clarify again. This has to do with the 
panels, the mobile panels that can be used to fence in 
animals and other things, right? 
A Right. 
Q I believe your testimony was earlier that there was 
eleven 10 foot and four 16 foot panels that are still on Miss 
Stone's property that you claim are your property, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. Looking at that sheet that's in front of 
you, can you tell us what the new value of those panels is? 
A Well, the new value would be 114.95. 
Q Okay. Is that for the 10 foot or the 16 foot? 
A That's for the 16 foot. 
Q Okay. How about the 10 foot? 
THE COURT: Give me the 16 foot again, cost of it. 
BY MR. STEVENSON: 
Q Thank you. Hear him? 
A Pardon? 
THE COURT: Give me the price again of the 16 foot 
panel. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. The 16 foot panels would be at 
pp 
1 Q And do you know what that number is? 
2 A Not right off. It would be 700 — well, let's see. 
3 Be 800 something. 
4 Q Okay. Well, we can go through this summary here in a 
5 minute. 
6 But, Your Honor, I think just --
7 ( A I had that on the back of one of my papers, that I 
wrote it on the back. 
MR. STEVENSON: Your Honor, just take judicial notice 
10 I of what the 10, or, I guess 11 times 74.95 would be the value 
11 of the new panels. Then seven times 16 would be the value of 
12 the -- I mean --
13 THE WITNESS: Four times. 
14 MR. STEVENSON: Four times -- four times, I guess 
15 104.95 would be the value of the other panels. 
16 BY MR. STEVENSON: 
17 Q Now, you have testified that there is also 12 square, 
18 I guess, panels. What are you talking about with those? 
19 A Okay. These were panels that was there. Joe Adair 
20 says that he thinks they were there when Nolan Kirtland had 
21 his horses there on the place prior to Marlene and them 
22 coming there. And they are a different type of gate. I have 
23 never seen them sold anywhere. I don't know whether they 
24 have been handmade or what. But they were on the northeast 
25 corner of the shed and where the pigeon pen is. 
exact date. 
Q Okay. And do you recall having any other discussions 
with Miss Stone after February 1st in which you discussed the 
property prior to the closing date? 
A You mean what went with the property? 
Q Yes. What went with the property. 
A We didn't really discuss anything other than -- and 
I'm not sure that when we were in the barn looking -- she 
took us to the barn to show us the water hookups and the 
electrical hookups in the barn. I'm not sure if that was 
before or after we signed the contract. But nothing was ever 
said other than what we discussed in her bedroom in the 
hallway on February 1st when we signed the papers then. 
Q Okay. Now, I want you to focus in on that discussion 
on February 1st. You said you had a discussion with her in 
her bedroom or in the hallway. And tell me to your 
recollection what was said. 
A About what went with the property? 
Q Yes. 
A That it would include all of the loafing sheds, all 
of the panels, the barn, the hay barn, that she no longer --
she had sold or eliminated all of her livestock. She no 
longer had a use for it. 
Q Okay. Did she talk about any of the waters or 
feeders? 
145 
A Every -- all the waters, the feeders, the horse 
walker. All of the horse equipment that would go with the 
upkeep of horses. The controlling of where -- the 
whereabouts of the horses. 
Q Okay. Did she indicate at that time that she was 
interested in developing the 15 acres behind your property? 
A Yes. 
Q Did she indicate what she was intending to do with 
the 60 -- well, with the, I guess you said it was later you 
found out that there was going to be a right-of-way? 
A Right. 
Q At the time you said on that date, though, she 
discussed wanting to have a right-of-way? 
A She discussed wanting to have a right-of-way. 
Q Did she say what she wanted to put in the 
right-of-way? 
A She was going to develop that into a subdivision. 
And she needed a right-of-way to get back to that. 
Q Okay. And, at that time, tell me about anything that 
you recall about her, the statements she stated. Do you 
recall anything else about what she stated would come with 
the property? 
A Best of my knowledge is -- to the best that I 
remember, she said if you bought the 2 acres it would include 
all the loafing sheds, all the gates, all the panels, all the 
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waterers, all the feeders, the horse barn and the hay shed. 
Q Okay. Now, in front of you is what's marxed as 
Defendant's Exhibit 3. And it's the Bill of Sale. 
A Three? 
Q I think it should be to your left. To your left. 
A Yes . 
Q The bottom paragraph -- well, let me ask you first: 
Have you seen this document before? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Do you recall seeing it at the closing, of 
when you had the closing on the home? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. This document has been stipulated to by the 
parties. If you'll look at the bottom of paragraph, bottom 
sentence of the first paragraph, it says, "Particularly 
described as follows:" And then it lists a number of things, 
"Oven, range, refrigerator, window covering, two irrigation 
shares, all loafing -- lounging and loafing sheds, panels 
gates, feeders, waterers and horse walker as presently 
exist." Is that the same understanding that you had on 
February 1st when you spoke with her that this was the 
personal property? 
A Yes. 
24 I Q That was being sold with the real estate? 
25 A Yes. With the 2 acres. 
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4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q 
of the 
At that time -- when I say at that 
closing, did you already know where 
boundaries were? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
When we signed the final closing? 
Yes. 
After her surveyor? 
Yes. 
Yes. 
time, at the 
the property 
Q Okay. Of the items that are listed there under this 
Bill of Sale, were any of these items on Miss Stone's 
property at the date of closing? 
A Yes. 
Q Well, let me state it this way so I can be clear. 
The date after closing, the dare after you closed and you now 
owned the property, which of these items were physically 
located on Miss Stone's property? 
A There was a double loafing shed, a single loafing 
shed, and then a loafing shed that was, had a roof and two 
sides. There was the horse walker. There were two metal 
feeders. And I don't know how many panels and gates. 
Q Okay. And, to your knowledge, has there been any 
dispute about the feeders? Are you using all the feeders 
that were on either her property or yours? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And the horse walker, that's been moved onto 
your property, correct? 
A Yes, it has. 
Q All right. And when did you first learn that there 
was a dispute about, that there was a dispute about the 
contract? 
A About these specific items? The --
Q Yes. 
A It was when she told us she didn't want us leasing 
her property anymore. She said that --
Q Let me ask you: Do you remember roughly when that 
was when she said she didn't want you leasing the property 
anymore? 
A Verbally or in writing? 
Q Weil, how about first verbally? 
A Verbally, it was about the 1st of August. 
Q Okay. And then in writing? 
A As near as I can recall, maybe the end of October. 
Q Okay. And then is it your -~ what did she say that 
made you believe that some of these items were in dispute? 
A The statement she made to me the first part of August 
was -- I was out at the barn with my grandchildren. And she 
drove out there and told me that she had heard that my 
husband had been saying that the sheds belonged to us. 
And I told her, Yes, that was my understanding. 
And she said that they did not. 
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loafing sheds, panels, gates, feeders, waterers, and horse 
walker as presently exist.1' Okay. That's your signature 
down at the bottom, February 1st, '08, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. On February 1st of 2008, did you intend 
to include the horse walker? 
A I can't remember. Let's see. I think I had talked 
to my kids about that. And they said -- no. No, wait. I'm 
wrong. Because Mr. Flint hadn't -- I had just decided maybe 
I would just keep the horse walker, I think, until my kids 
told me, mom, it's hooked to the barn. But in between there 
Mr. Flint had made it known to me that he would really want 
that horse walker. 
Q Okay. I heard your prior testimony about him. You 
claim that Mr. Flint said he really wanted the horse walker. 
You were also asked earlier about any conversations about any 
individual equipment out on your property. Were there 
discussions on February 1st of 2008 with the Flints in the 
presence of Joe Adair about the individual equipment that was 
out on your property? 
A No. 
Q Okay. So, there was no, there was no discussion 
about the individual equipment out there? 
A No. Mr. Flint just said, Does this stuff stay? And 
we were looking straight east from my bedroom. 
i p ^  
Q Okay. But you are now saying that he also said 
really wanted the horse walker? 
A But not at that time. 
Q Okay. When did he say that he really wanted the 
horse walker? Was that after this date? 
A Had to be, because that was the first time I met 
them. 
Q Okay. So, it had to be after February 1st, then? 
A Yeah. 
Q So, can we establish, at least, that on this date, on 
February 1st, 2008, Mr. Flint had not yet told you he really 
wanted the horse walker? 
A Well, I didn't know he wanted the horse walker until 
I seen it in his offer. And Mr. Adair had put it in there. 
And I thought I didn't agree to sell that. But I talked to 
my kids. And I did tell. Mr. Flint that I would make it part 
of the deal. Because of the wiring to the barn and the fact 
that if he had a horse on there it would be walking partly on 
his land and 66 -- because I knew where 66 feet was. I 
didn't know where his corners were at that time, but I did 
know I had to keep 66 feet. So, I measured over so I would 
have some idea. And I knew for a fact that that horse 
walker, if there was a horse on it, would be walking 
partially on his property. 
Q So, is it your testimony that you had already gone 
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out and measured the 66 feet before February 1st, 2008? 
A I had measured that in the summer before that. 
Because when I put it up for sale, I knew that if I couldn't 
sell it all, and I was pretty sure I couldn't because no one 
could afford it, that 1 would have to have a road. And I 
went to the city and asked them what the requirements was. 
And they told me. And so, I thought, okay. I had my 
neighbor help me measure over so that I could have some idea 
of where my land would end. 
Q Okay. So, you -- at some point prior to February, 
you already knew where that 66 feet landed? 
A I did, yes. 
Q All right. My next question is, when you saw this 
Real Estate Purchase Contract, and it says all loafing, 
lounging sheds, panels, gates, feeders, waterers, horse 
walker as presently exist, did you ask at all either to your 
real estate agent or to the Flints or Joe Adair, did you ask 
what that constituted, what all lounging and loafing sheds 
meant? Did you inquire as to what that meant? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Now, as presently exist. Let me ask you about that 
statement. 
A Okay. 
Q As presently exist. At the time you didn't know 
exactly where the boundary was going to be, did you? 
187 
because it gave me more room to spread out. But, yes, fr< 
the time we talked in her home that day and from what Joe 
3 I told us, yes, I figured everything that was there. She says 
4 she wanted to get out of it, she didn't want nothing to do 
5 with it, she was upset because her husband spent so much time 
6 out there with them, she just wanted to get away. 
7 I BY MR. STEVENSON: 
Q Okay. And her intention -- okay. Then the question 
9 1 was asked you whether the horse walker was attached to your 
10 land. Was the horse walker physically located on your 
11 2 acres after closing? 
12 A No. No. 
13 Q Okay. Was there electrical wire coming from your 
14 property to the horse walker? 
15 A There was. 
16 Q Okay. Tell me about this horse walker. Was this a 
17 large structure? 
18 A Pretty good size. It damn near filled this room. 
19 Q Okay. What was the structure sitting on top of the 
20 horse walker? 
21 A Big cement slab. 
22 Q Okay. Is the cement slab on your property? 
23 A No. It's on her's. 
24 Q So, from the time of the closing, what was your 
25 understanding about whose property the horse walker was? 
ADDENDUM E 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
MARLENE STONE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD FLINT and JUDY FLINT, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
Case No. 080907234 
In this case, Defendants seek a determination, under their counterclaim, that the}' 
purchased from Plaintiff certain personal property as part of a real estate purchase transaction. 
All claims under Plaintiffs complaint were resolved through mediation, leaving only 
Defendants' claim. The parties tried this case without a jury on April 15 and 20, 2009. Following 
closing arguments, the Court took the matter under advisement for a review of the trial evidence 
and supporting exhibits. Based on the evidence and controlling law, the Court grants judgment in 
favor of Plaintiff, no cause of action on Defendants' counterclaim. The Court also awards 
Plaintiff a reasonable attorney fee for her defense of Defendants* counterclaim. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Marlene Stone owned real property known as 6006 S. 7100 W. in Hooper, Utah, 
consisting of approximately 17 acres. She listed the property for sale on the multiple listing 
service, giving prospective buyers three options: 1) purchase all 17 acres, 2) purchase two acres, 
or 3) purchase one acre. 
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Defendants Richard Flint and Judy Flint became interested in the property. They and their 
realtor, Joe Adair, met with the Plaintiff on February 1, 2008. During this initial meeting, 
Plaintiff explained that her husband had recently passed away, that she wanted to be relieved of 
the burden of managing the property by herself and that she was interested in selling, preferably, 
all of her 17 acres, including the structures on the property. Mr. Flint inquired, "Does all of this 
stuff stay with the property?" Plaintiff replied affirmatively. Both parties seem in agreement that 
when Defendant asked his question, he was looking out of Plaintiff s bedroom window, facing to 
the east of Plaintiff s property, overlooking the hay barn, horse barn, and various items of 
personal property. For ease of description in this decision, the Court will refer to this personal 
property collectively as structures. These structures included mobile fencing, called paners; 
mobile gates that interfaces with the panels; open sheds, called loafing sheds, for animals that can 
be moved: and a horse walker. 
Defendants expressed interest to Plaintiff however, in purchasing only two acres, 
encompassing the home and the two barns. Plaintiff explained that if the Defendants wanted only 
two acres, the two acres would not include a strip of her property of approximately 66 feet in 
width, lying on the northern part of her property and extending eastward, because she needed an 
access to the remaining 15 acres; otherwise, she would essentially be landlocked. Plaintiff further 
explained that in order to sell the two acres the Defendants were interested in, encompassing the 
home and two barns, she would need to obtain a survey to partition this amount of real estate 
from the aggregate 17 acres because, at that time, the exact boundaries of the proposed two acres 
were undetermined. 
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After the parties discussed Defendants' interest in only two acres, no further discussion 
occurred regarding the structures, except regarding the horse walker, as discussed below. In 
point, the parties never addressed the structures or where they might be situated after the survey 
and partition of two acres from the remaining 15 acres. 
Based on the discussions that occurred in Plaintiffs bedroom, the Defendants assumed 
that all structures on the entire 17 acres went with the two acres they were would eventually 
purchase because Plaintiff did not want to manage the property any more. Plaintiff on the other 
hand, assumed that since the Defendants wanted less than the 17 acres, only the structures 
existing on the two acres would pass in the conveyance to the Defendants; she would keep the 
structures situated on the remaining 15 acres. 
Later that same day, February 1. 2008, Mr. Adair, Defendants' realtor, prepared and 
presented to Plaintiff a real estate purchase contract (hereafter "REPC"). The first addendum to 
the REPC provided that Plaintiff would have the property surveyed and the four corners staked to 
Defendants* satisfaction prior to closing of the sale. The first addendum also listed the structures 
included in the sale: "All lounging/loafing sheds, panels, gates, feeders/waterers and horse 
walker as presently exist." 
When the Defendants presented the REPC through Mr. Adair, she told him that, if they 
wanted the horse walker, the Defendants would need to move it completely on to the two acres. 
As of February 1, 2008. the base of the horse walker was situated on the eventual ground that 
was part of the 66-foot-wide access reserved by Plaintiff, although the arm of the horse walker 
rotated partially into the two acres the Defendants would purchase. Further, the electric motor 
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operating the horse walker was wired to the barn, also within the two acres that the Defendants 
were receiving as part of the two acres. Otherwise, Plaintiff accepted the Defendants* offer. 
As the parties agreed. Plaintiff had the property surveyed and the four corners of the 
propert)' staked just prior to the closing on the property on April 16, 2008. Defendants physically 
inspected the staked property they were to purchase and were satisfied with the boundaries. Even 
at this juncture of the parties' dealings, no further discussions occurred regarding the structures. 
as they may lie inside and outside the two acres. 
The boundaries of the two acres Defendants purchased are defined by the pencil line on 
exhibit PI. On exhibit PL north is to the top of the exhibit and west is to the left of the exhibit. 
The northern boundary of the two acres abuts the 66-foot-wide strip Plaintiff retained ownership 
in for access to the remaining 15 acres of her property. Included in the boundaries of the two 
acres are the home in the lower left-hand corner of the exhibit, the two barns identified with the 
letters G and H, and the structures defined with the letters F, D, and I. Excluded from the 
boundaries of the two acres, and appearing in Plaintiffs access, are three loafing sheds defined 
with letters A. B, and C. Structure A abuts the property line between Plaintiffs propert}' and a 
third part)' neighbor. Structure E also remains on Plaintiffs remaining property that extends to 
the east. 
In purchasing the home and the two acres. Defendants assumed the original address of 
6006 S. 7100 W. in Hooper, Utah. Hooper City gave Plaintiff a new address for her remaining 
15 acres, known as 5990 S. 7100 W., Hooper, Utah. 
Contemporaneous with the closing on the real property, the title company prepared a bill 
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of sale that Plaintiff signed and Defendants accepted in the closing. The bill of sale transferred 
title to "that certain personal real property YIOM> at 6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, Utah" (emphasis 
added). The bill of sale then enumerated the personal property specified in the first addendum to 
the REPC "as presently exist." 
Also contemporaneous with the closing. Plaintiff leased to Defendants the remaining 15 
acres of her property to Defendants for one year. That lease was later broken in 2008, and the 
parties resolved their rights and liabilities under that lease through mediation after Plaintiff filed 
suit. Thus, those matters are not before the Court. Nonetheless, it is relevant in this proceeding 
that, as a result of friction between the parties stemming from Defendants' use of the remaining 
15 acres under the lease agreement, the parties realized that each side had a different 
interpretation of the REPC and bill of sale regarding the meaning of "all" of the structures. 
Defendants believed they had purchased all of the structures existing on the 17 acres, whereas 
Plaintiff believed she had sold only all of the structures on the two acres that she had conveyed to 
the Defendants. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
This dispute in the interpretation of the REPC and the bill of sale is the crux of the 
lawsuit between the parties. Defendants contend that the language of the REPC and bill of sale 
gave them "all lounging/loafing sheds, panels, gates, feeders/waterers and horse walker as 
presently exist," both on the two acres they had purchased and on the 15 acres retained by the 
Plaintiff. On the other hand, Plaintiff argues that Defendants received only the structures on the 
property they purchased. At issue is whether the word all as used in the REPC and bill of sale, is 
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ambiguous. The Court holds that it is not ambiguous. 
ANALYSIS 
Contractual ambiguity may occur in two contexts: u(l) facial ambiguity with regard to the 
language of the contract and (2) ambiguity with regard to the intent of the contracting parties." 
Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ^ 25, 190 P.3d 1269. 1276. The Utah Supreme Court went on to 
further clarify: "The first context presents a question of law to be determined by the judge. The 
second context presents a question of fact where, if the judge determines that the contract is 
facially ambiguous, parol evidence of the parties' intentions should be admitted." Id. However. 
"before permitting recourse to parol evidence, a court must make a determination of facial 
ambiguity." Id. In other words, extrinsic evidence offered to show that an ambiguity exists does 
not 'trump cthe language of the contract.'" Flores v. Earnshaw\ 2009 UT App 90, j^ 10. quoting 
Dairies, 2008 UT APP 51 at f27. 190 P.3d at 1276. In short, unless the Court finds that the 
language of the REPC is ambiguous, it may not consider parol evidence, or the discussions of 
what occurred upstairs in Plaintiffs bedroom concerning what personal property goes with the 
real estate conveyance. The contract controls the rights of the parties. 
Thus, the first responsibility of this Court is to determine whether a facial ambiguity 
exists. The Utah Supreme Court clarified the procedure for determining whether a contract is 
facially ambiguous also in Dairies, where the Court set forth a two-step analysis. First, 
"when determining whether a contract is ambiguous, an)7 relevant evidence must 
be considered. Otherwise, the determination of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, 
namely, it is based solely on the extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic 
education and experience." Second, after a judge considers relevant and credible 
evidence of contrary interpretations, the judge must ensure that "the 
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interpretations contended for are reasonably supported by the language of the 
contract." 
Id at % 26, 1 90 P.3d at 1276. quoting Ward v lntermouniain Farmers Ass n, 907 P.2d 264. 268 
(Utah 1995). The Court later clarified that "we [do] not intend that a judge allow surrounding 
circumstances to create ambiguity where the language of a contract would not otherwise permit." 
Dairies, 2008 UT 51, at \ 27, 190 P.3d ai 127th 
The Utah Court of Appeals applied these principles in Floras, 2009 UT App 90. In 
Floras, the parties entered into an agreement for the sale of a "yet-to-be-built condominium unit.'* 
Id. at K 1. Although the building itself did not yet exist, the parties used a standard real estate 
purchase contract (REPC) to accomplish the sale. Clause 1.1 of the REPC, entitled "Included 
Items" stated: "Unless excluded herein, this sale includes the following items if presently owned 
and attached to the Property*. . .'" Id. at % 5 (emphasis added b) Flares court). The trial court 
determined that the surrounding circumstances of the case, including the fact that the building 
had not yet been built, rendered clause 1.1 ambiguous. The court of appeals disagreed, holding 
that clause 1.1 was not facially ambiguous. Id. at 1^ 14. The court emphasized that "the 
enumerated items are included in the sale only if they were presently owned and attached to the 
Property.''' Id. Since the building had not yet been constructed, "none of the items listed in 
clause 1.1 were owned and attached to the property at the time the REPC was executed^]'" Id. 
The court concluded that "based on the plain language of the REPC. the parties intended for the 
sale to convey only a 'shell' of [the unit].'" Id. 
The Flores case is factually similar to the present case. Plaintiff and Defendants have a 
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signed agreement identifying what is included in the sale. Clause 1.1 of their agreement is 
identical to clause 1.1 of the contract in Floras. It states that the listed items are included "if 
presently owned and attached to the Property.'' The Court determines that, as in Flares., this 
provision is unambiguous and cannot be read to include any items that were not "presently 
owned and attached to the Property.'* namely, the two acres Defendants purchased. The property 
included in the sale, identified as a pencil line on Plaintiffs exhibit Pl5 includes the house, the 
two barns labeled G and H, and the structures labeled F, D5 and 1. It does not include the loafing 
sheds labeled A, B. and E, nor the panels or gates on most of the structure labeled C. Those 
structures are not "presently owned and attached to the Property" to be conveyed and. under the 
unambiguous terms of the contract, were not intended to be conveyed to Defendants. 
Moreover, the bill of sale, which is the final, integrated expression of the parties' intent 
concerning the transfer of personal property in this transaction, transferred only those items of 
personal property presently existing on the two acres conveyed or otherwise specifically 
identified, such as the horse walker. The bill of sale plainly states what Plaintiff sold to 
Defendants, namely, "that certain personal property now-1 at 6006 S. 7100 W.? Hooper, Utah, 
more particularly described as follows: oven/range, refrigerator, window coverings, 2 water 
irrigation shares, all lounging and loafing sheds, panels, gates, feeders, waterers, and horse 
walker as presently exist." (Emphasis added.) Consequently, the Defendants received only three 
loafing sheds on their newly acquired real property, not the other three remaining on Plaintiffs 
property. Likewise, they received the panels and gates on their propert)-, as well as the waterers 
and feeders on their property. While the base of the horse walker was on Plaintiffs property, and 
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thus may technically be on her property, because it also rotated partially on Defendants" property 
and because the apparatus was wired to the bam, Plaintiff chose to allow them to have i t 
provided the}' moved it completely on to their property. 
Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable attorney fee for the successful defense of Defendants' 
counterclaim, as provided in paragraph 17 of the REPC. Accordingly, she may present her 
counsel's affidavit to the Court, sending also a copy to Defendants' counsel to give him an 
opportunity to object to the reasonableness of the fees. As counsel prepares the affidavit, the 
Court reminds the parties that reasonable attorney fees are not merely measured by what an 
attorney actually bills and the number of hours spent on the case. Rather, in determining fees, the 
Court, should consider those factors addressed in case law, namely, what work was actually 
performed, the work reasonably necessary to adequately defend the matter, the attorney's billing 
rate and whether it is consistent with customar}' rates in the locality, and any other circumstances 
listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 
990 (Utah 1988). 
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the respective expectations or understandings of the parties arising from 
their discussions upon their initial meeting on February 1, 2008, the real estate purchase contract 
superceded all prior negotiations, representations, and understandings of the parties, as the clear 
language of paragraph 14 of the REPC provides. Moreover, the Court concludes, as a matter of 
law., that the REPC and the bill of sale governing the transfer of the personal property and 
structures are both unambiguous. Defendants are entitled to all structures that exist on the two 
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acres at the time of the contract and at closing, unless otherwise expressly provided in the 
contract or bill of sale. 
Dated this (7H day of April. 2009. 
MM.. 0, KK^, 
Michael D. Lyon, Judge I 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
MARLENE STONE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD FLINT and JUDY FLINT, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 080907234 
Judge: Michael D. Lyon 
Non-jury trial in the above-entitled matter come on regularly for hearing before the above-
entitled Court on April 15 and April 20,2009. Plaintiff, Marlene Stone, was personally present and 
represented by her attorney, Robert L. Neeley, and Defendants, Richard Flint and Judy Flint, were 
personally present and represented by their attorney, David B. Stevenson. Plaintiff and Defendants 
were sworn and testified, together with witness Joe Adair and the court having received exhibits 
from Plaintiff and Defendants and having taken the matter under advisement and having issued its 
Memorandum Decision, therefore makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff, Marlene Stone, owned real property known as 6006 S. 7100 W. in Hooper, Utah, 
consisting of approximately 17 acres. 
2. Plaintiff listed the property for sale on the multiple listing service, giving prospective 
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buyers three options: 1) purchase all 17 acres, 2) purchase two acres, or 3) purchase one acre. 
3. Defendants, Richard Flint and Judy Flint, became interested in the property. They and 
their realtor, Joe Adair, met with the Plaintiff on February, 1, 2008. 
4. During this initial meeting, Plaintiff explained that her husband had recently passed away, 
that she wanted to be relieved of the burden of managing the property by herself, and that she was 
interested in selling, preferably, all of her 17 acres, including the structures on the property. Mr. 
Flint inquired, "Does all of this stuff stay with the property?" Plaintiff replied affirmatively. Both 
parties seem in agreement that when Defendant asked his question, he was looking out of Plaintiff s 
bedroom window, facing to the east of Plaintiff s property, overlooking the hay barn, horse barn, and 
various items of personal property. These structures included mobile fencing, called panels; mobile 
gates that interface with the panels; open sheds, called loafing sheds, for animals that can be moved; 
and a horse walker. 
5. Defendants expressed interest to Plaintiff however, in purchasing only two acres, 
encompassing the home and the two barns. 
6. Plaintiff explained that if the Defendants wanted only two acres, the two acres would not 
include a strip of her property approximately 66 feet in width, lying on the northern part of her 
property and extending eastward, because she needed access to the remaining 15 acres; otherwise, 
she would essentially be landlocked. 
7. Plaintiff further explained that in order to sell the two acres the Defendants were interested 
in, encompassing the home and barns, she would need to obtain a survey to partition this amount of 
real estate from the aggregate 17 acres because, at that time, the exact boundaries of the proposed 
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two acres were undetermined. 
8. After the parties discussed Defendants' interest in only two acres, no further discussion 
occurred regarding the structures, except regarding the horse walker, as discussed below. In point, 
the parties never addressed the structures or where they might be situated after the survey and 
partition of two acres from the remaining 15 acres. 
9. Based on the discussions that occurred in Plaintiffs bedroom, the Defendants assumed 
that all structures on the entire 17 acres went with the two acres they would eventually purchase 
because Plaintiff did not want to manage the property anymore. 
10. Plaintiff, on the other hand, assumed that since Defendants wanted less than the 17 acres, 
only the structures existing on the two acres would pass in the conveyance to the Defendants; she 
would keep the structures situated on the remaining 15 acres. 
11. Later that same day, February 1, 2008, Mr. Adair, Defendants' realtor, prepared and 
presented to Plaintiff a real estate purchase contract (hereafter "REPC"). The first addendum to the 
REPC provided that Plaintiff would have the property surveyed and the four corners staked to 
Defendants" satisfaction prior to closing of the sale. The first addendum also listed the structures 
included in the sale: "all lounging/loafing sheds, panels, gates, feeders/waterers and horse walker as 
presently exist." 
12. When the Defendants presented the REPC through Mr. Adair, she told him that, if they 
wanted the horse walker, the Defendants would need to move it completely on to the two acres. As 
of February 1, 2008, the base of the horse walker was situated on the eventual ground that was part 
of the 66-foot-wide access reserved by Plaintiff, although the arm of the horse walker rotated 
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partially into the two acres the Defendants would purchase. Further, the electric motor operating the 
horse walker was wired to the barn, also within the two acres that the Defendants were receiving as 
part of the two acres. Otherwise, Plaintiff accepted the Defendants' offer. 
13. As the parties agreed, Plaintiff had the property surveyed and the four corners of the 
property staked just prior to the closing on the property on April 16, 2008. Defendants physically 
inspected the staked property they were to purchase and were satisfied with the boundaries. Even 
at this juncture of the parties' dealings, no further discussions occurred regarding the structures, as 
they may lie inside and outside the two acres. 
14. The boundaries of the two acres Defendants purchased are defined by the pencil line on 
exhibit PI. On exhibit PI, north is the top of the exhibit and west is to the left of the exhibit. The 
northern boundary of the two acres abuts the 66-foot-wide strip Plaintiff retained ownership in for 
access to the remaining 15 acres of her property. Included in the boundaries of the two acres are the 
home in the lower left-hand corner of the exhibit, the two barns identified with the letters G and H, 
and the structures defined with the letters F, D, and I. Excluded from the boundaries of the two 
acres, and appearing in Plaintiffs access, are the three loafing sheds defined with the letters A. B. 
and C. Structure A abuts the property line between Plaintiffs property and a third party neighbor. 
Structure E also remains on Plaintiffs remaining property that extends to the east. 
15. In purchasing the home and the two acres, Defendants assumed the original address of 
6006 S. 7100 W. in Hooper, Utah. Hooper City gave Plaintiff a new address for her remaining 15 
acres, known as 5990 S. 7100 W., Hooper, Utah. 
16. Contemporaneous with the closing on the real property, the title company prepared a bill 
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of sale that Plaintiff signed and Defendants accepted in the closing. The bill of sale transferred title 
to "that certain personal real property now at 6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, Utah.'1 The bill of sale then 
enumerated the personal property specified in the first addendum to the REPC "as presently exist." 
17. Also contemporaneous with the closing, Plaintiff leased to Defendants the remaining 15 
acres of her property to Defendants for one year. That lease was later broken in 2008, and the parties 
resolved their rights and liabilities under that lease through mediation after Plaintiff filed suit. Thus, 
those matters are not before the Court. Nonetheless, it is relevant in this proceeding that, as a result 
of friction between the parties stemming from Defendants' use of the remaining 15 acres under the 
lease agreement, the parties realized that each side had a different interpretation of the REPC and 
bill of sale regarding the meaning of "all" of the structures. Defendants believed they had purchased 
all of the structures existing on the 17 acres, whereas Plaintiff believed she had sold only all of the 
structures on the two acres that she had conveyed to the Defendants. 
THE COURT having entered its Findings of Fact makes the following Conclusions of Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. At issue is whether the word all, as used in the REPC and bill of sale, is ambiguous. The 
Court holds that it is not ambiguous. 
2. Contractual ambiguity may occur in two contexts:"(1) facial ambiguity with regard to the 
language of the contract and (2) ambiguity with regard to the intent of the contracting parties." 
Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 5 1 ^ 25, 190 P.3d 1269, 1276. The Utah Supreme Court went on to 
further clarify: "The first context presents a question of law to be determined by the judge. The 
second context presents a question of fact where, if the judge determines that the contract is facially 
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ambiguous, parol evidence of the parties' intentions should be admitted." Id. However, "before 
permitting recourse to parol evidence, a court must make a determination of facial ambiguity." Id. 
In other words, extrinsic evidence offered to show that an ambiguity exists does not "trump 'the 
language of the contract.'" Flores v. Earnshaw, 2009 UT App 90 j^ 10, quoting Dairies, 2008 UT 
APP 51 at U 27, 190 P.3d at 1276. In short, unless the Court finds that the language of the REPC is 
ambiguous, it may not consider parol evidence, or the discussions of what occurred upstairs in 
Plaintiffs bedroom concerning what personal property goes with the real estate conveyance. The 
contract controls the rights of the parties. 
3. Thus, the first responsibility of this Court is to determine whether a facial ambiguity 
exists. The Utah Supreme Court clarified the procedure for determining whether a contract is 
facially ambiguous also in Dairies, where the Court set forth a two-step analysis. First, 
"When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be 
considered. Otherwise, the determination of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it is based 
solely on the extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and experience." Second, 
after a judge considers relevant and credible evidence of contrary interpretations, the judge must 
ensure that "the interpretations contended for are reasonably supported by the language of the 
contract." 
Id. at TI 26, 190 P.3d at 1276, quoting Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass % 907 P.2d 264, 268 
(Utah 1995). The Court later clarified that "we [do] not intend that a judge allow surrounding 
circumstances to create ambiguity where the language of the contract would not otherwise permit." 
Dairies, 2008 UT 51, at \ 27, 190 P.3d at 1276. 
4. The Flores case is factually similar to the present case. Plaintiff and Defendants have a 
signed agreement identifying what is included in the sale. Clause 1.1 of their agreement is identical 
to clause 1.1 of the contract in Flores, It states that the listed items are included "if presently owned 
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and attached to the Property." The Court determines that, as in Flares, this provision is 
unambiguous and cannot be read to include any items that were not ''presently owned and attached 
to the Property," namely, the two acres Defendants purchased. The property included in the sale, 
identified as a pencil line on Plaintiffs exhibit PI, includes the house, the two barns labeled G and 
H, and the structures labeled F, D, and I. It does not include the loafing sheds labeled A, B, and E, 
nor the panels or gates on most of the structure labeled C Those structures are not ''presently owned 
and attached to the Property'* to be conveyed and, under the unambiguous terms of the contract, were 
not intended to be conveyed to Defendants. 
5. Moreover, the bill of sale, which is the final, integrated expression of the parties' intent 
concerning the transfer of personal property in this transaction, transferred only those items of 
personal property presently existing on the two acres conveyed or otherwise specifically identified, 
such as the horse walker. The bill of sale plainly states what Plaintiff sold to Defendants, namely, 
"that certain personal property naw at 6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, Utah,..., more particularly described 
as follows: oven/range, refrigerator, window coverings, 2 water irrigation shares, all lounging and 
loafing sheds, panels, gates, feeders, waterers, and horse walker as presently exist." Consequently, 
the Defendants received only three loafing sheds on their newly acquired real property, not the other 
three remaining on Plaintiffs property. Likewise, they received the panels and gates on their 
property, as well as the waterers and feeders on their property. While the base of the horse walker 
was on Plaintiffs property, and thus maj' technically be on her propert}', because it also rotated 
partially on Defendants' property and because the apparatus was wired to the barn, Plaintiff chose 
to allow them to have it, provided they moved it completely on to their property. 
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6. Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable attorney fee for the successful defense of Defendants" 
counterclaim, as provided in paragraph 17 of the REPC. 
7. Notwithstanding the respective expectations or understandings of the parties arising from 
their discussion upon their initial meeting on February 1, 2008, the real estate purchase contract 
superceded all prior negotiations, representations, and understandings of the parties, as the clear 
language of paragraph 14 of the REPC provides. Moreover, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, 
that the REPC and the bill of sale governing the transfer of the personal property and structures are 
both unambiguous. Defendants are entitled to all structures that exist on the two acres at the time 
of the contract and at closing, unless otherwise expressly provided in the contract or bill of sale. 
DATED this day of May 2009. 
APPROVED AND ORDERED BY: 
MICHAEL D. LYON 
District Court Judge 
RULE 7(f)(2) NOTICE 
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the undersigned will submit the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Order Dismissing Respondent's 
Counterclaim, Affidavit of Robert L. Neeley, and Memorandum of Cost to: 
Michael D. Lyon 
District Court Judge 
2525 Grant Ave. 
OgderuUT 84401 
for signature at the expiration of eight (8) days from date of mailing, unless written objection is 
filed prior to that time. 
ROBERT L. NEELEY 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, Order Dismissing Respondent's Counterclaim, Affidavit of Robert L. Neeley, and 
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2009, postage prepaid, at the following address: 
David B. Stevenson 
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Attorneys at Law 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, UT 84403 
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